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Consociational democracy is a system of government outlined by Arend Lijphart in 
response to the mystery of the stability of the democratic systems of several small Western-
European states despite their intense societal divides.  In the years since he outlined these states’ 
consociational systems, much has changed.  The question thus must be asked – is it possible to 
transition from a Consociational democracy with a focus on consensus-building to a more 
majoritarian political system that emphasizes competition between parties?  This question will be 
addressed by a study of three states – the Netherlands, Belgium, and Lebanon.  The Netherlands 
has transitioned successfully from a consociational democracy to a more competitive system, and 
Belgium and Lebanon have remained consociational.  The political and social structures will be 
examined to determine what allowed for the Netherlands to transition and what stopped Belgium 
and Lebanon from doing so as well.  Ultimately, it appears as if the Dutch divisions within 
society have successfully been mediated to such a degree that they no longer cause intense 
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CHAPTER 1 - INTRODUCTION 
  
Scholars have long debated the impact deeply entrenched divisions have on democratic 
systems.  Some argue that divisions are normal and do not hinder democratic consolidation, 
whereas others point to the difficulties they bring about.  It is normal for there to be differences 
of opinion in a democracy, but in some societies these divisions go further.  Sometimes a society 
is so divided by segmental cleavages – be they linguistic, regional, cultural, racial, ethnic, or 
ideological- that they cannot be dealt with on the basis of majority-rule.  It is in these societies 
that a consociational democracy is established in order to mediate the differences between 
groups and to allow for a stable political system to emerge. 
 Consociationalism was first outlined by Arend Lijphart to explain how four deeply 
divided European states remained politically stable.  He outlined several institutional and 
informal features that are crucial in a consociational democracy, such as the grand coalition 
cabinet, the mutual veto, the principle of proportionality, segmental autonomy, and prudent elite 
leadership1.  These factors are designed to ensure that all societal segments are involved in the 
decision-making process in order to bring about a stable political system. Consociational 
democracy is not always permanent, however.  It can be seen as a temporary measure designed 
to provide stable governance to societies that are deeply divided and to promote some form of 
common identity and a transition to a more competitive political system rather than one that 
relies on consensus-building.   
                                                          
1 Arend Lijphart, Democracy in Plural Societies: A Comparative Exploration, 2nd ed. (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1975), 25 
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1.1.0 - Review of the Literature  
 When conducting research on consociational democracy, one must begin with Lijphart’s 
considerable body of work.  As the scholar who first outlined the model, his research is crucial as 
a foundation from which other studies on consociationalism can emerge.  He first outlined the 
theory in his article in 1969, and then fully defined it in his book Democracy in Plural Societies 
(1977).  This book is comparative in focus, and outlines how consociationalism was used in 
several European states to develop a stable political system despite their intense divisions.  He 
expanded on his theories in his book Patterns of Democracy (2012) to compare thirty-six 
democracies on whether their political systems rely on majority-rule or consensus-building.  
Finally, he also conducted studies utilizing his consociational framework to analyze specific 
political systems, such as his study of India (1996).  Ultimately, Lijphart’s research is useful as it 
defines consociational democracy and works as a foundation from which further studies can 
emerge. 
 Once one has reviewed Lijphart’s contributions, one can begin to study the applications 
of his theories and further analysis of consociational systems.  It becomes clear that there is a 
strong focus on case-studies, as shown by scholars like Dekmejian (1978); Deschouwer (2006); 
Pennings and Keman (2008); Sinardet (2010); Reuchamps (2017); and Calfat (2018).  This is 
fitting as this allows for a more detailed study of the system and the society it is found in. It is 
noteworthy that the majority of studies use a single case, however.  Some studies are 
comparative; such as Jones (2017), Andeweg (2019), and Lijphart’s 1977 book; but the majority 
only use a single case.  This leads to few questions being resolved in a comparative manner. 
Furthermore, Lebanon is absent from comparative studies; which is a significant oversight. 
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One interesting aspect of consociationalism that scholars analyzed is the idea of de-
consociational transition.  This transition is usually understood as that of moving from a system 
of government that focuses on consensus-building to one that focuses more on competition 
between political parties and majority-rule practices.  This was measured by Lijphart (1975) as 
he witnessed the Dutch transition from consociational politics to more competitive practices. 
This was followed by Andeweg (2008) who conducted a study years after the fact to measure 
whether the Netherlands truly underwent this transition.  They outlined a number of institutional 
measures – such as the size of coalition governments and success of new parties – and informal 
measures – such as the actions of the elites – that provide strong evidence toward the conclusion 
that the Netherlands has undergone a de-consociational transition.  Many of these factors were 
mentioned by Andeweg et al (2008) when they conducted a study of parliamentary opposition in 
former consociational states.  Ultimately, these studies are useful as they outline what it means 
for a state to undergo this transition, but they generally focus on whether the transition can be 
proven, and not why it occurred.  Bogaard et al. (2019) recently noted that the process of de-
consociationalism is worthy of further study. 
One aspect that all consociational scholars acknowledge as important is elite co-
operation.  Lijphart notes that the elites overcoming their differences and working together is 
necessary for the survival of the regime.  Studying the elites is part of most consociational 
studies, but as Bogaard et al. (2019) point out, the question of leadership has not been fully 
explored.  All research refers to its importance, but the focus is largely on institutional factors 
when considering the success of consociationalism.  The role of leadership in consociational 
democracy and in the process of de-consociationalism has not been fully studied by scholars. 
4 
 
What becomes apparent after a review of the relevant literature is that there remain areas 
that require further study.  Consociational studies largely use single-case studies, and the 
relatively few comparative studies always omit Lebanon.  It is also clear that the question of de-
consociational transition has not received as much attention as other questions regarding 
consociationalism, especially why it occurs.  Finally, the institutions within consociational 
democracies received more attention at the cost of studies of elite leadership, despite scholars’ 
acknowledgement of its importance.  Thus, a study that fills these gaps in the literature would be 
worthwhile. 
1.2.0 - Methodology 
After reviewing the literature, an interesting question emerges: what allows for a 
consociational democracy to undergo a de-consociational transition?  The hypothesis of this 
study is that in order for a state to undergo a de-consociational transition it has to diminish the 
underlying reasons causing the consociational democracy, namely the divisions and tensions 
within society.  Thus any factor that increases tensions and divisions in society, such as historical 
antagonisms, poor elite leadership, and loads on the system, work against the prospect of de-
consociational transition.  
This hypothesis will be proven through a comparative-case study using historiography, 
the tools outlined in the consociational literature, and elements of the structured-focused 
comparative approach outlined by Alexander George and Andrew Bennett. This approach 
involves two aspects: it is ‘structured’ in that it asks the same general questions of each case in 
order to standardize data collection and allow for comparisons, and it is ‘focused’ in that it only 
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focuses on certain aspects of the historical cases that are relevant2. The ‘focused’ aspect will be 
applied to the current study by isolating which aspects are important in a discussion of de-
consociational transition.  The ‘structured; aspect will be applied by asking general questions 
regarding these factors of each case. This will allow for a standardized comparison of the cases. 
The three cases that will be studied are the Netherlands, Belgium, and Lebanon.  The 
Netherlands is the clearest example of a country that had a deeply engrained consociational 
tradition, but was able to undergo a de-consociational transition and emerge as a stable 
competitive democracy.  Belgium and Lebanon are both countries that remain deeply divided 
and retain their consociational traditions.  A comparison of these three cases will explain what 
leads to de-consociational transition and what hinders it.  One may question the wisdom of 
including two European cases and one Middle-Eastern case, but it is necessary for the purposes 
of this study.  As was mentioned above, Lebanon is frequently left out of comparative analyses 
of consociational systems, and thus the literature would benefit greatly from its inclusion.  Also, 
the inclusion of a Middle Eastern case allows for the potential of the consociational model to be 
explored fully.  Lebanon is more similar to the majority of the states in the rest of the world, 
whereas Europe is quite an outlier in its historical trajectory. It also makes sense to include both 
Lebanon and Belgium as this allows for a more detailed examination of what hinders a de-
consociational transition.  A simple explanation for Lebanon is that its location in a tense 
regional system entrenches divisions and forces it to stay consociational.  Belgium is equally 
divided, yet it is located in a very stable regional system.  Thus, there must be a more nuanced 
explanation.   
                                                          
2 Alexander George and Andrew Bennett, Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences (Cambridge: 
MIT Press, 2005), 58. 
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The analysis of these cases will measure a number of independent variables – represented 
by the general questions as part of the structured focused approach. It will begin with an overall 
discussion of the consociational system of the three cases, showing that they indeed all fall under 
the classification and are thus comparable.  The study will then look at a number of important 
variables that could differentiate the three cases and may contribute to a de-consociational 
transition.  Finally, the study will look at the nature of de-consociational transition, how it did or 
did not emerge, and why this is the case. 
The first variable is the nature of the divisions in the society and the consociational 
model. This will help define consociational democracy and show that the three cases are 
comparable.  It will also determine whether the differences in the consociational systems 
themselves impacted the prospects for de-consociational transition.  The general questions are: 
What is the nature of the divisions in society? What are the origins of the system? What shape 
did the consociational system take? 
The next variable is the historical narratives of the various groups in society.  This is 
drawn from Edward Azar’s research (1978), as he notes that conflicts between identity groups 
can remain latent and lie beneath the surface of society, ready to ignite given the right trigger.  
The existence of these historical grievances between identity groups can contribute to the 
tensions and divisions in society, and thus must be measured when discussing what helps or 
hinders de-consociational transition.  The question is: Are there historical narratives among the 
segments of society, if so, are they antagonistic? 
The third variable is the overall leadership of the elites. The informal convention of elite 
cooperation is necessary for the consociational system to survive, so the ability of the elites to 
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work together prudently to lead the country needs to be measured.  The degree to how effective 
the elites were at doing this may shed some light on the political culture within the system which 
could contribute to diminishing tensions and eventual de-consociational transition.  The general 
question is:  Were the elites able to come together to rule prudently day-to-day?  
The fourth variable is the loads on the system.  This is drawn from Lijphart’s (1969) 
research.  He notes that significant pressures on the system from controversial factors can strain 
the leadership abilities of the elites and lead to an increase in the divisions in society. The 
prevalence and severity of these loads can thus impact de-consociational transition as it can be 
difficult to achieve if the tensions within society are getting inflamed regularly by controversial 
factors.  The general question is: Were there loads on the system – internal or external – that put 
significant pressure on the system, and if so, how were they dealt with? 
The fifth variable that will be analysed is what happened to the divisions within the 
system.  Because consociational democracies are created to mediate divisions, measuring 
whether they have diminished is an important factor when determining de-consociational 
transition. The general question is: What happened to the divisions over time? 
Finally, the dependent variable will be measured by looking at the transition of each case 
to competitive political practices without destabilizing society.  The general question is: Were 
competitive political practices able to emerge smoothly in society?  
1.3.0 - Limitations 
 Naturally, there will be limitations to this study.  As it is a small-number case study, the 
findings are not as generalizable as more expansive studies, but through the inclusion of Lebanon 
its generalizability is improved.  In this study, both Global North and Global South states are 
8 
 
represented, broadening the scope of the paper.  One final limitation is the lack of strict causal 
links that can be proven. However, sufficient causality can be proven through a small-number 
case approach that this study will be worthwhile. 
 Ultimately, this paper will contribute significantly to the current body of literature on 
consociational democracies.  As has been stated, the amount of comparative literature on these 
states is lacking, Lebanon is frequently excluded from comparative studies, and the process of 
de-consociational transition is understudied. Thus, this paper will be a valuable addition to 
consociational scholarship. 
CHAPTER 2 – THE NATURE OF THE DIVISIONS AND THE CONSOCIATIONAL 
MODEL 
  
This chapter will outline how the three cases embody the consociational framework 
outlined by Lijphart.  This is important because it will show that the states are comparable, and 
will allow for an evaluation of how well they fit the model.   
2.1.0 - What is the nature of the divisions? 
2.1.1 – The Netherlands  
The Dutch consociational period began in 1917 in order to accommodate the divisions 
that had existed within the country since independence from Habsburg Spain3.  The primary 
division in the Netherlands is religious, with a secondary cleavage along socio-economic lines.  
The segments are the Roman Catholics; the Calvinists, which are a collection of numerous 
protestant churches of varying orthodoxy; and the Secular bloc, which is composed of those who 
                                                          
3 Rudy B. Andeweg, “Consociationalism in the Low Countries: Comparing the Dutch and Belgian Experience,” 
Swiss Political Science Review 25, no. 4 (2019): 409-410. 
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are part of very minor churches or have no religious affiliation.   The religious blocs have 
geographical strong-holds, with the Catholics being dominant in the south, the Calvinists in the 
southwest and center, and the Secular bloc being dominant in the west and north4. They are not 
regional identities, however.  One must not conflate regional demographic strength with regional 
identities.   
The second division is based on class – which is the division between the working, 
middle, and upper-classes. These divisions cut across the religious blocs: each group has its share 
of members from each class.  One group is not generally perceived to be richer than the others.  
The class division is especially important to note for the Secular bloc, however, as they do not 
have the cohesion provided by common religious doctrine and are thus more divided along class 
lines.  They split into two separate blocs along the class lines: the Socialists – representing the 
lower-middle and working classes – and the Liberals – representing the middle and upper-
classes5.  In practice, there were four segments in Dutch society: the Catholics, the Calvinists, the 
Socialists, and the Liberals. 
2.1.2 – Belgium 
Initially, in Belgium, the divisions were similar to those found in the Netherlands.  From 
1918-1961, the divisions were along religious and class lines. It was a predominantly Catholic 
country, and thus the divisions only fell between the Catholic bloc and the Secular bloc.  Like the 
Netherlands, Belgium also had class divisions that crosscut these two blocs, causing the Secular 
                                                          
4 Arend Lijphart, The Politics of Accommodation: Pluralism and Democracy in the Netherlands, 2nd ed. (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1975), 16-18. 
5 Rudy B. Andeweg, “Coalition Politics in the Netherlands: From Accommodation to Politicization,” Acta Politica 
43, no. 2-3 (2008), 255. 
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bloc to split into the Socialists and the Liberals. Thus, there were three segments: the Catholics, 
the Socialists, and the Liberals6.  
After 1970 however, there was a realignment of the consociational system. The ethno-
linguistic divisions between the Dutch-speaking Flemish and the French-speaking Walloons 
came to dominate the system. These divisions had been part of Belgian society since its inception 
in 18307, however, they were latent and the religious-class divisions dominated.  From 1961-
1970, the religious/class divisions decreased, allowing for the ethno-linguistic tensions to 
heighten and dominate the system.  These identities developed strong nationalist tendencies – 
especially within Flanders.  Further complicating matters, there is a third region as well – the 
Brussels-Capital region – which is geographically located within Flanders, but is predominantly 
French-speaking; and there is a small German-speaking population in Wallonia.  Initially, 
Belgium was similar to the Netherlands, but now Belgium is deeply divided along the ethno-
linguistic cleavage. 
2.1.3 – Lebanon 
Lebanon is an incredibly divided country with 18 identity groups recognized in 
government.  The divisions fall largely along religious lines, with some ethnic differences, like 
the small Armenian population.  The divisions can largely be categorized as between the 
Christian and Muslim communities, but it is important to note that these groups are not 
homogenous blocs and there are further divisions within these groups8.  The three identity groups 
that have played the most significant role in Lebanon are the Maronite Christians and the Sunni 
                                                          
6 Kris Deschouwer, “And the Peace Goes On? Consociational Democracy and Belgian Politics in the Twenty-First 
Century,” West European Politics 29, no. 5 (2006): 897. 
7 Antoon van de Braembussche, “The Silence of Belgium: Taboo and Trauma in Belgian Memory,” Yale French 
Studies 102 (2002), 35. 
8 Barry Rubin, “Dealing with Communalism,” Journal of Democracy 17, no. 1 (2006), 58-59 
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and Shia Muslims.  Together they make up the overwhelming majority of the population9.  These 
religious groups have regional strongholds, such as the Maronites in the Mount Lebanon region 
and the Shia in the Beqaa valley, but, like the Netherlands regional identities did not emerge10. 
Finally, in Lebanon there are no divisions along class lines.  Like all countries, there are 
tensions based on class, but this never translated itself into becoming a set of identities.  Some 
communities were perceived to be poorer than the others – such as the Shia Muslims - and thus 
the class issues fuelled the already divided religious tensions; just like the regional tensions were 
translated in religious issues11.  All tensions in the system were translated into issues along the 
religious divisions. 
2.1.4 – Comparison 
Ultimately, when one looks at the three cases, some similarities emerge.  All three of the 
countries have divisions based on religion, two of the three have divisions based on class, and all 
have regional strongholds for certain identity groups.  All of these similarities differ by degree, 
however.  Lebanon clearly has the strongest religious divisions due to their 18 different 
recognized identity groups, and what is interesting is that these divisions are what completely 
dominate the country.  No other issues seem strong enough to supplant religion.  In the 
Netherlands and Belgium the economic divisions were able to emerge strongly enough to split 
the secular bloc into separate identity groups, and in Belgium the ethno-linguistic identities were 
able to dominate the political system in the latter half of its consociational life.  In Lebanon, 
however, none of the religious communities split along the class line.  This could be attributed to 
                                                          
9 Danilo Di Mauro, “The Consociational Democracy at Stake: Four Approaches to Explain Lebanon Past and 
Present,” Acta Politica 43, no. 4 (2008), 453-454. 
10 Cyrus Schayegh, “1958 Reconsidered: State Formation and the Cold War in the Early Postcolonial Arab Middle 
East,” International Journal of Middle East Studies 45, no. 3 (2013), 422 
11 Richard H. Dekmejian, “Consociational Democracy in Crisis: The Case of Lebanon,” Comparative Politics 10, 
no. 2 (1978), 260. 
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the fact that there was no secular bloc in Lebanon, and thus all communities are strongly bound 
by religious ties like the Dutch and Belgian Catholic/Calvinist blocs. This speaks to the strength 
of the religious identities that it absorbs the class and regional tensions and translates them into 
an extension of the religious conflict. 
It is also noteworthy that out of the three cases, Belgium is the only state to have that 
third level of division – the ethno-linguistic division.  In both the Netherlands and Lebanon, there 
were regional strongholds for each of the segments of the population, but this did not translate 
into regional identities.  It merely became another factor in the identity and tensions of the 
existing blocs.  In Belgium, due to the unique ethno-linguistic divisions between the regions, this 
created a third level of divisions that would further complicate the political life of the country.   
2.2.0 - What is the origin of the consociational system? 
2.2.1 – The Netherlands 
The Dutch consociational system began in 1917 when two things of note occurred; first 
was the outbreak of World War 1.  Although the Netherlands was technically neutral during this 
period, it was being fought just south of their borders in Belgium and France. This would 
increase the tension and fear within the country as they were worried that the conflict would spill 
over their borders. The second was the peak of two deeply divisive issues – state funding for 
denominational schools and universal suffrage - that were splitting the country apart.  These 
issues divided the system to such an extent that the government had to deal with them in a 
consociational manner, by organizing summit meetings with leaders from all the segments.  They 
came to an agreement to solve both issues with proportionality.  The state would fund all schools 
13 
 
based on the proportion of their enrolment, and universal suffrage would be implemented with a 
strict proportional representation electoral system12.   
This marked the beginning of the consociational tradition in the Netherlands as the issues 
that deeply divided the segments of society were solved using the consociational methods of the 
grand coalition, the principle of proportionality, and segmental autonomy.  This tradition would 
continue through the entire consociational period of the Netherlands.  
2.2.2 – Belgium 
The Belgian consociational system officially began in 1918 with the Pact of Loppem.  
This was a result of the First World War and the necessity to unite and rebuild the country.  The 
war had brought the ethno-linguistic issue to the forefront, and the Socialist bloc – at this point 
never having allowed into cabinet – was pushing for universal suffrage.  Fearing the social unrest 
that this could bring, the three major parties met and concluded this pact, introducing universal 
male suffrage13.  This created a three-party grand coalition government, and began the tradition 
of using these summit meetings between the party elites to solve controversial issues. 
Belgian consociationalism can be broken into two periods.  The first period, from 1918-
1961 dealt with the Catholic-Socialist-Liberal division, but these divisions were diminished 
significantly by 196114.  Between 1961 and 1970, the ethno-linguistic division began to take 
prominence.  This largely had to do with the switch in economic strengths in the country.  
Wallonia had long been the economic power of the country, but in this period their industry 
began to stagnate and the service sector of Flanders proliferated.  Flanders was also the more 
                                                          
12 Rudy B. Andeweg, “Consociationalism in the Low Countries: Comparing the Dutch and Belgian Experience,” 
413. 
13 Kris Deschouwer, “And the Peace Goes On? Consociational Democracy and Belgian Politics in the Twenty-First 
Century,” 898-899. 
14 B. Guy Peters, “Consociationalism, Corruption and Chocolate: Belgian Exceptionalism,” West European Politics 
29, no. 5 (2006), 1082. 
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populous region and had undergone a strong nation-building project, so they began to flex their 
economic and demographic muscle in government.  This worried the Walloons, and thus 
tensions increased.  Ultimately, this led to the meeting between the political elites and the 
establishment of the constitutional reforms of 1970, which instituted a number of consociational 
measures to protect the minority groups15.  This consociational resolution to the tensions of the 
60s can thus be seen as the beginning of the second consociational period of Belgium where the 
ethno-linguistic cleavage became dominant. 
2.2.3 – Lebanon 
The Lebanese consociational system has a long history.  The Mount Lebanon region was 
ruled using power-sharing measures between the Maronites and the Druze since the Ottoman era. 
Then, during the French Mandate era, this region was expanded to include predominantly 
Muslim areas like Beirut, Tripoli, and the Beqaa Valley to create the modern state of Lebanon.  
The 1926 constitution solidified a power-sharing structure between the Christians and Muslims 
and forced government to consist of members of both communities.  Finally, in 1943 with the 
threat of the French colonial power leaving the country and the possible power vacuum that 
could emerge as a result, the leading elite from the Maronite community – Bishara al-Khoury – 
and the Sunni community – Riad al-Solh – came together and created the National Pact.  This 
was a gentlemen’s agreement that stated that power would be shared along identity lines, and 
posts in government would be awarded based on religious identity and their respective 
demographic strengths – based on the census from 193216. 
                                                          
15 Wilfried Swenden and Maarten Theo Jans, “’Will It Stay or Will It Go?’ Federalism and the Sustainability of 
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This period of consociationalism lasted until 1975 and the onset of the Lebanese civil 
war.  The civil war lasted for 15 years, ending in 1990 with the Ta’if Accord17.  This marked the 
beginning of Lebanon’s second consociational experience, although little was changed.  The 
institutions and power-sharing measures remained the same, based on the National Pact, but the 
powers between the top three officials were balanced and there was parity of Muslims and 
Christians in the legislature18.  Ultimately, the consociational system looked the same with the 
same identity groups represented, but the day-to-day practice of politics changed due to the 
shifting of powers.  
2.2.4 – Comparison 
One noteworthy similarity among all cases is something that Lijphart remarked as 
conducive to the establishment of a consociational democracy –the existence of an external 
threat forcing the elites to come together and rule in a consociational fashion19.  In the 
Netherlands, it was the First World War raging south of their borders and the internal threat of 
the school and suffrage issue.  For Belgium it was the aftermath of the First World War and the 
threat of the ethno-linguistic division and the suffrage issue that forced the elites to come 
together.  Finally, for Lebanon, it was the threat of the French leaving and the question of what 
would become of Lebanon that forced the Maronite and Sunni elite to come together. 
An interesting difference is that two of the three cases saw a second consociational period 
emerge as a result of a new crisis.  For Belgium, their initial divisions lessened to the point where 
it was no longer politically salient, but there was the growing tension and division along the 
ethno-linguistic cleavage which forced a new consociational arrangement to emerge. For 
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Lebanon, it was the desire to end the civil war that caused a new consociational period to 
emerge. In the Netherlands, they simply saw the diminishing of divisions and a gradual de-
consociational transition.  No new crisis emerged that forced a new consociational system. 
2.3.0 - What shape did the consociational system take? 
2.3.1 – The Netherlands 
The segments of Dutch society were represented through five political parties – the 
Catholic People’s Party (KVP), the Labour Party (PvdA), the Liberal Party/People’s Party for 
Freedom and Democracy (VVD), and the two Calvinist parties – the Anti-Revolutionary Party 
(ARP) and the Christian Historical Union (CHU), which were split due to differing levels of 
orthodoxy20.  These parties were the dominant actors throughout the consociational period, and 
got largely the same amount of support during the entire period as there were low levels of 
electoral volatility21.  There were other, smaller, parties but they did not have much electoral 
success and never entered a governing coalition during the consociational period. 
The Dutch consociational system clearly followed the format outlined by Lijphart (1977).  
It embodied each of the four elements of consociationalism that he noted to be essential to its 
survival.  The first is the grand coalition cabinet.  He noted that this is the primary mechanism 
for elite cooperation in a consociational democracy22.  It is where all the important leaders of the 
segments can come together to make decisions and come to a consensus.  In the Netherlands, 
while the governing cabinets were not true grand coalitions – as one of the five major parties was 
usually in opposition - they were all major winning coalitions, which meant that they included 
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more parties than necessary for a simple majority23.  In fact, until the end of the 1950s, they 
almost always represented about 75% of the seats in parliament24.  There are other instances 
where the grand coalition was embodied, such as ad hoc grand councils organized to solve 
controversial issues and through parliamentary committees.  The committees provided parties 
that were not part of the governing coalition the ability to engage in policy discussions and let 
their segments views be heard in policy25.  In the Netherlands, chief among these is the Social 
and Economic Council. 
The Social and Economic Council is an advisory body in the Dutch government that is 
incredibly influential.  It is composed of 45 members, 15 appointed from the labour unions, 15 
from the employer’s associations, and 15 by the government.  Each segment of society has their 
own organizational bodies, such as labour unions and employer’s associations, thus the members 
appointed to this council are largely seen as representatives of the segments of society26.  This 
council has the mandate to offer advice on all proposed social and economic measures, and 
decisions made by the council are reached by consensus.  This council may technically be an 
advisory body, but the advice it gives is tantamount to future government policy.  This is because 
the decisions reached by the council are essentially the results of the compromises of the 
segments of society, so for government to contravene what it advises would be highly 
inflammatory27.  This leads government to following the decisions of the Council quite 
faithfully. Ultimately, despite the grand coalition not being fully embodied in the physical 
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cabinet, the representatives of the segments have ample opportunity to meet and contribute to the 
decision-making process. 
The second element of consociational democracy is the mutual veto.  This refers to the 
measures provided to minorities to protect their interests against the tyranny of the majority28.  
The Netherlands had no institutional measures for the minority veto; it relied on convention.  All 
of the segments were minorities, so it would have been difficult to push through controversial 
legislation without the dissenting segments being able to put up significant resistance.  The 
Netherlands also had an informal understanding among all the segments that it was detrimental 
to the political system to force policy decisions that any segment did not agree with. Thus 
government consulted all of the groups about major policy decisions29.  Despite the absence of 
institutional measures to protect minority interests, the Dutch consociational system operated by 
the convention that compromise was crucial and minority rights should be protected. 
The third element of consociationalism is the principle of proportionality.  This refers to 
using proportional allocation as the principle by which many government decisions are made – 
such as civil service appointments and funding for certain programs30.  This is crucial, as it takes 
decisions that could be potentially divisive and political – such as how much money to provide to 
segmental organizations – and reduces them to a mathematic logic that the segments would 
struggle to argue with.  This principle was widely used in the Dutch consociational system, as 
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shown in 1917 with the solutions to the school and suffrage issues, and it continued to be a 
defining feature of the Dutch consociational system31.  
The final element of consociationalism is segmental autonomy.  This refers to the 
devolution of certain powers to the different segments so that they can live largely autonomous 
lives.  The idea is that by leaving cross-segment interaction to the elites and allowing the 
segments to live insular lives, there are fewer opportunities for antagonisms to emerge between 
the groups32.  The Netherlands embodied this principle through “pillarization”.  This is where 
each identity group had expansive organizations associated strictly along identity lines33.  These 
organizations included news media, education systems, labour unions, employer’s associations, 
and more34.  This created a country where the segments lived largely autonomous lives and 
rarely interacted with those of another segment, as shown by the low levels of intermarriage35.  
Clearly, the Netherlands embodies the consociational model quite well. 
2.3.2 – Belgium 
In the first consociational period, there were three major parties – the Catholic Party, the 
Socialist Party, and the Liberal Party.  These three parties were national and represented both 
Flanders and Wallonia.  They formed government exclusively with little input from smaller 
splinter parties.  In the second consociational period, this changed.  Due to the increasing 
tensions around the linguistic cleavage, between the 60s and 70s all three major parties split 
along the linguistic line, creating separate parties – i.e. a Dutch Catholic party and a French 
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Catholic party.  This eventually led to the creation of two separate party systems in each region 
with a proliferation of new parties.  There are now only regional parties36. This creates 
difficulties as they need to come together in a national legislature and work together despite the 
exclusively regional focus of the parties.  It is also important to note that in Flanders, nationalist 
and separatist parties have become very powerful. 
In terms of the grand coalition, Belgium is much like the Netherlands, because a full 
grand coalition cabinet was rarely established.  Government was usually composed of a coalition 
of two parties with the other being in opposition – the Catholics usually played the pivot role37.  
Belgium is different than the Netherlands however as they had few alternative measures to act as 
a grand coalition – such as the Dutch Social and Economic Council.  The most significant were 
the ad hoc summit meetings of the leaders of the key parties whenever a crisis emerged that had 
to be dealt with38.  The second period functioned in a similar fashion39. There is one compromise 
that does follow the logic of the grand coalition, however - the linguistic parity of French and 
Dutch in Belgian cabinets40.  As the ethno-linguistic cleavage was always present in the Belgian 
system, it became a rule that there should be an equal balance of Dutch and French-speaking 
cabinet members. 
Belgium formally entrenched the mutual veto in its consociational system.  As the 
tensions between the ethno-linguistic groups got worse during the 60s, a minority protection 
clause was included in the constitutional reforms of 1970.  The first is that any law affecting 
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cultural and educational interest of the language group can only be passed through majority votes 
of both the Dutch and French-speaking representatives41.  The second is the “alarm bell 
procedure”.  This is an extreme protection measure, whereby if ¾ of a segment vote to ‘ring the 
alarm bell’ in parliament in response to a policy issue, all discussion on the issue must stop and 
the executive – which has linguistic parity – has 60 days to resolve the issue.  If they fail to do 
so, it generally leads to the dissolution of parliament and a new election42.  Due to the increased 
tensions in Belgian politics, minority protection measures have been institutionalized in order to 
provide strong protections to the groups. 
Belgium also utilizes the principle of proportionality.  Its electoral system is one of 
proportional representation, like the Netherlands43.  What is interesting in Belgian, however, is 
that proportionality is not always strictly followed.  They use it for the allocation of funds but 
also ignore it for key appointments44.  The most obvious example of this is the linguistic parity 
that can be found in the cabinet.  Technically, based on the principle of proportionality, there 
should be more Dutch-speaking cabinet ministers, but, due to the sharp divisions, the cabinet 
must have linguistic parity in order to appease the segments.  This shows that although 
proportionality can make some difficult decisions easier, not everything can be reduced to simple 
mathematical logic.  Sometimes counter-proportional decisions must be made for the stability of 
society. 
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Finally, the last consociational device that Belgium uses is segmental autonomy, and this 
is fully embodied in both of Belgium’s consociational periods.  During the first period, like the 
Netherlands, Belgium utilized pillarization with the segments having their own organizations, 
like labour unions and news media, which allowed them to live largely separate lives45. As of 
1958, the state also funded each segment’s education system46.  However, Belgium entered a 
new consociational period after the constitutional amendments of 197047.  These amendments 
marked the beginning of Belgium’s transition to a federal system, which would be completed in 
199348.  This created a complicated system with three levels to reflect the sharp ethno-linguistic 
divisions within the Belgian system.  The federal government is in charge of national issues, and 
as tensions and issues emerged, more of its powers were devolved to the regions.  It also created 
the regional level with three regions – Flanders, Wallonia, and Brussels-Capital.  Finally, it 
created the community level to provide governance powers to the Dutch, French, and German-
language communities49.  The separation between the regional and community jurisdictions was 
done to protect the minority populations living in another region, and to protect the French-
speaking region of Brussels-Capital who - despite being French-speaking - have a different 
culture than Wallonia.  The Flemish combined the regional and community jurisdictions to create 
one Dutch-Flemish legislature because they had undergone a nation-building project. 
Federalism is the ultimate example of segmental autonomy.  It allows for the segments to 
live completely independent lives as they have extensive powers to legislate on issues that 
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impact their day-to-day lives.  Currently, Belgium is quite de-centralized as the regions and 
communities have considerable powers50.  They segments live almost entirely separate lives, to 
the point where the rates of working in and interaction with another region are quite low51.  Out 
of all the consociational tools that Belgium utilized, segmental autonomy is the one they rely on 
the most to keep stability in the current system.   
2.3.3 – Lebanon  
 The political actors within the Lebanese consociational system are slightly different than 
that of the Netherlands and Belgium.  In those countries, political parties dominate and the elites 
work within the parties to make decisions.  This role is reversed in Lebanon with the elites – 
known as zu’ama (singular zaim) - being the dominant actor and the political parties acting as 
vehicles for their rule. These are traditionally powerful families, be it feudal land-owners or other 
dominant figures within communities, who rule through patron-client networks.  They get 
support from their religious community, and they then represent them in government and provide 
them with funds, job opportunities, etc52.  In the second consociational period after the civil war, 
this was largely unchanged.  The militias that emerged during the civil war period created similar 
patron-client relationships with their respective communities and provided social services and 
jobs.  These militias – such as the Amal Movement, Hezbollah, and the Lebanese Forces - then 
entered the political establishment, and many of the traditional families lost power and influence 
to these new zu’ama.  This period also saw the emergence of new families who took power from 
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traditional zu’ama, such as the Hariri dynasty becoming dominant in the Sunni community.  
These new groups act in the same manner as the zu’ama of the initial consociational period.53. 
An important note regarding the Lebanese elite is that in the modern era, due to the 
regional system it finds itself in, they have created a set of alliances which aligns with their 
desire for international allegiance.  It was born out of the experience of the country after the civil 
war.  The Ta’if Accord allowed Syria to dominate and control the country, leading to significant 
grievances among many of the communities – primarily among the Maronites and Sunnis54.  It 
culminated with large demonstrations in March 2005 after Syria seemingly assassinated the 
Sunni leader Rafic Hariri.  On March 8, citizens staged large demonstrations calling for Syria to 
stay in the country, whereas on March 14 citizens protested demanding Syria leave55.  Syria left a 
little while later, and the elites of the country then divided themselves between the March 8 – 
pro-Syria and Iran - and March 14 – pro-west and Saudi Arabia – alliances56.  All elites are now 
split within the Lebanese political system between these alliances, further complicating the 
consociational picture. 
 The Lebanese consociational system also embodies the four elements of 
consociationalism outlined by Lijphart.  The Grand Coalition is embodied by including political 
actors from all communities within cabinet57.  This leads to cabinet formations taking an 
incredibly long time, and in periods where they fail to include all actors there is serious domestic 
strife.  There is a tendency by the elites to isolate certain powerful actors to weaken them, but 
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this often leads to crisis58.  For example, before the civil war, the zu’ama tried to keep dominant 
Druze leaders – such as Kamal Jumblatt - out of cabinet, increasing domestic tensions59.  In the 
modern era, there were actions taken against Hezbollah, and this caused an 18 month crisis that 
ended with the Doha Accord, which entrenched the rule that even opposition members should be 
included in government60.  These large cabinets are often very fragmented and struggle to agree 
on policy decisions.  
There is another method that Lebanon uses as a form of grand coalition – by reserving 
political seats for the certain identity groups.  The top three positions in Lebanon’s government 
are reserved for members of the three dominant identity groups – the president must be a 
Maronite Christian, the prime minister must be Sunni, and the speaker of parliament must be 
Shia61.  This ensures that the three most significant communities are represented in the top 
government positions and in the decision-making process.  During the first consociational period, 
however, the president was clearly the dominant actor, which caused tensions with the other 
communities.  This was changed in the Taif Accord, which de facto balanced the powers among 
the top three actors62.  This shows that the grand coalition was established by the Lebanese elite, 
but it was not always perfectly implemented as some key actors were purposely left out at times, 
leading to crisis. 
 Lebanon also embodies the minority veto.  This provision was only mildly 
institutionalized in the first consociational period as this system was dominated by the president 
                                                          
58 Natalia Nahas Calfat, “The Frailties of Lebanese Democracy: Outcomes and Limits of the Confessional 
Framework,” 283. 
59 Danilo Di Mauro, “The Consociational Democracy at Stake: Four Approaches to Explain Lebanon Past and 
Present,” 43 
60 Ohannes Geukjian, “Political Instability and Conflict After the Syrian Withdrawal from Lebanon,” 534-535. 
61 Tamirace Fakhoury, “Do Power-Sharing Systems Behave Differently amid Regional Uprisings? Lebanon in the 
Arab Protest Wave,” Middle East Journal 68, no. 4 (2014), 508. 
62 Ohannes Geukjian, “Political Instability and Conflict After the Syrian Withdrawal from Lebanon,” 527. 
26 
 
– and thus the Maronite community had a veto over the political system. The other communities 
had a minor veto, as decisions by cabinet had to be passed by a 2/3 vote63.  Thus there was not a 
perfect minority veto implemented institutionally, but unofficially there was an understanding 
that the communities had to work together for the common good, and any majoritarian policies 
were met with fierce resistance from the other communities.  In the second consociational period, 
however, the minority veto has been applied more equally as the top three positions have their 
own unique powers giving them a veto over the political process64.  Issues do emerge as the 
elites are a bit too willing to use their veto, stalemating the system.  Overall, however, in the 
current consociational system, the minority veto is more evenly applied. 
 The third element is proportionality, and it is here that Lebanon faces the gravest 
criticism.  There are two choices one can make with proportionality: one can either use it strictly, 
and allocations and appointments are done purely based on percentage of the population; or one 
can utilize parity and elevate minority groups to an equal standing with the majority group to 
ensure that the tyranny of the majority does not occur.  Lebanon attempted to do both and has 
missed the mark.  They attempted proportionality by pegging the seat and government 
appointments to proportional representation.  They utilized the 1932 census for this, in which the 
Maronites had a plurality, thus giving them the most seats and most powerful position.  Overall, 
the Christians outnumbered the Muslims, thus the seats were allocated on a basis of 6 Christians 
for every 5 Muslims.  The problem is that a proportional system requires constant change to 
remain accurate due to demographic changes.  Lebanon never had another census, due to its 
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sensitive political nature, and thus the seat and power allocations did not change65.  This 
eventually grew to irritate the other communities, primarily the Muslims who were seen to be 
overtaking the Christians in population, and yet remained under-represented in government.  
Eventually, after the civil war, it was changed so there is an equal 50-50 split in parliament 
between Christians and Muslims.  This may appear to fit the parity model, but not quite.  Within 
the Muslim and Christian camps, the seats are still divided ‘proportionally’, but they are 
distorted.  The Shia segment gets the same amount as the Sunni population, despite most 
estimates saying that they are the most populous community in the country66.  Thus, on closer 
inspection, it reflects neither parity nor strict proportional representation. 
 Finally, the last element of consociational government is segmental autonomy. Due to the 
nature of the Lebanese political system – with the zu’ama playing a dominant role in the 
provision of social services and funding - there is an incredible degree of segmental autonomy. 
The Lebanese state is actually quite weak with the communities having control over countless 
aspects of daily life, such as marriage, child custody, inheritance, and education67.  The zu’ama 
are in charge of petitioning the state for the funds to provide these services and how they are 
implemented within the community.  This did not change with the second consociational system 
after the civil war; what changed was which actor played the role of zaim. In the case of 
Hezbollah, they have become the dominant force in providing services to the Shia community, 
and sometimes this expands to other communities as well.  They are now seen as the largest 
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provider of services in the entire country68.  This shows that the state has taken a hands-off 
approach to the daily lives of its citizens, allowing the communities to run themselves instead. 
2.3.4 – Comparison 
 Ultimately, when one looks at the consociational systems of the three states as a whole, 
there are significant similarities that allow a comparative study such as this to be conducted.  All 
three states have divisions based on religion with two having a socio-economic division as well.  
All three states have broadly similar origins of their consociational system with an external threat 
and internal divisions forcing the elites to come together in a consociational fashion.  This 
tradition would then last throughout the consociational periods of the countries.   
Finally, in terms of the actual consociational model, the three countries exemplify the 
sheer diversity of interpretations possible. All three states adhere to the four consociational 
elements, although there is some variation on the degree of success.  The Netherlands stands out 
as adhering, overall, the best to the consociational model.  They have a strong grand coalition 
tradition, adequate minority vetoes – even if it is by convention rather than formal rule – strong 
adherence to proportionality, and a strong model of segmental autonomy.  The Belgian model 
falters in its adherence to the grand coalition and there is a stronger tendency to majoritarian 
policies. Lebanon also struggled with aspects of the grand coalition and when implementing the 
principle of proportionality.   
In terms of the discussion regarding de-consociational transition and comparability, this 
shows that these states are comparable as they all embody the principles that Lijphart outlines. 
Thus a comparative study of the three cases to determine what contributes to a de-consociational 
transition is possible.  On the other hand, this chapter also shows that the adherence to the 
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characteristics of the model is not what sets these states apart.  Despite the differences in success 
in certain areas, the differences are not significant enough to contribute to the difference in de-
consociational transition.  It is important to note that the Netherlands embodied the model the 
best, but the other states’ deficiencies are not noteworthy enough to explain the difference in 
outcome.   
CHAPTER 3 – HISTORICAL NARRATIVES 
  
The idea of historical narratives and its role in consociational democracy is an adaptation 
of the research done by Edward Azar.  Throughout his career, he created and refined the theory 
of Protracted Social Conflict.  This is a theory that posits a form of conflict between identity 
groups that is different from overt violent conflicts.  Azar argued that it is possible for there to be 
conflict between identity groups over perceived grievances in areas like economic or political 
participation or a lack of recognition69.  These grievances take the form of latent antagonisms 
between groups that are carried on through their distinct historical narratives.  His theory is 
useful for a study of consociational systems because it focuses on the state as a crucial actor in 
the satisfaction or frustration of these community needs. It is useful to measure whether the 
identity groups in a consociational system have grievances against one another or with the state 
and whether the state is doing an adequate job of dealing with these issues. Also, it is important 
to measure the antagonistic narratives in deeply divided societies, as they could be detrimental to 
the diminishing of divisions and tensions in society, impacting the prospects for de-
consociational transition. Antagonistic historical narratives pit segments against one another, 
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contributing to tensions within society; so, a consociational democracy where these narratives 
exist would face a greater challenge in diminishing tensions and divisions than a democracy that 
does not have them.  This would thus contribute to a difference in de-consociational transition.  
Thus, this is an important factor to measure when discussing differences in de-consociational 
transitions. 
3.1.0 - Are there historical narratives among the segments of society, and if so, are they 
antagonistic?  
3.1.1 – The Netherlands 
 There were historical narratives within the segments of Dutch society, but they were not 
largely antagonistic.  Each segment emerged during the fight for independence from Spain, and it 
was here that their narratives were born.  The war of independence was one of political 
independence, but it was also a war over religion as they were fighting the Spanish imposition of 
Roman Catholicism.  Thus, the Calvinists were a driving force during this conflict as they fought 
this infringement on their religion.  The secular bloc also had strong national ties to this period as 
they had Calvinist origins and gained patriotic sentiment as they fought against religious 
“tyranny”.  The Catholic segment had a much different experience as they were in a difficult 
position, because the war was against Catholic Spain.  They were prohibited from holding public 
office and their services were banned.  Furthermore, when the two southern Catholic provinces 
were conquered by the Netherlands and included in the Republic, they were treated more as 
colonies and exploited economically70. 
 When one hears this, one would assume that there would be antagonistic narratives 
between the segments, especially the Catholics.  Luckily, this did not come to pass for a couple 
of reasons.  Ultimately, the prohibition of Catholicism was not as bad as it seemed.  Once 
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independence was achieved, being Catholic was not a crime, and private worship and services 
were tolerated.  By and large the Netherlands was tolerant of different religions.  Slowly, through 
political battles the Catholics won their political and religious freedoms.  The primary reasons 
why the Catholics did not become estranged from the greater Dutch nation was due to the 
interdependence of the South and the rest of the country economically.  More importantly, the 
Catholic elite at the time were clergymen, and Church doctrine did not condone revolution or 
secession.  This stopped tensions from becoming truly antagonistic71.  The elites within society 
made it so that the grievances did not get to be too entrenched.   
One final aspect can be looked at to explain the lack of antagonistic historical narratives 
in the Netherlands.  Throughout their history, the Dutch political actors fostered a tradition of 
compromise and acceptance of disagreement and diversity72.  This would contribute to the 
acceptance of different religious views and would contribute to the segments of Dutch society 
never becoming wholly antagonistic.  They had their differences and lived separate lives, but did 
not outright hate each other. 
Despite the existence of these separate identities and narratives, there were some unifying 
aspects to Dutch identity as well.  They had a common struggle against Spanish imposition, a 
common monarch, and a common language that all played unifying roles in Dutch society73.  
The monarch is a strong unifying symbol when times are good, but when controversy arises 
around the monarchy, it has the potential to destabilize society. During the consociational period, 
this nationalism should not be over-stated, but it cannot be ignored either.  Ultimately then, the 
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historical narratives of each segment exist, but they are not antagonistic of each other.  They 
mark different identities, but not negative ones. 
3.1.2 – Belgium 
 In the Belgian case there are no distinct historical narratives along the divisions in the 
initial period of consociationalism, but there are significant antagonistic narratives along the 
ethno-linguistic cleavage.  This identity is perfect for an application of Azar’s theory, as it was 
present but latent during the initial consociational period, and then it was brought to the forefront 
due to the political tensions of the 60s. The reason this identity came to the forefront as strongly 
as it did is because of the historical narratives and grievances that the communities had.  Belgium 
was de facto monolingual for many years, with French being the dominant language in business 
and government, despite the significant Dutch-speaking population and official freedom of 
language under the constitution.  Eventually, this would be rectified and the country would 
officially be made bilingual federally74.  This was done to allow both groups representation in 
their language, and to protect linguistic rights.  Due to the dominant role French had played in 
Belgium to this point and the fact that French-speaking Wallonia was the economic heart of the 
country, many Flemings had serious grievances with the system and with the Walloons; there is a 
famous story of Flemish foot soldiers fighting under officers who did not speak their language, 
symbolizing the Flemish grievances that they were second-class to the French-speakers75.  The 
long time it took for Dutch to be recognized within the state further emphasized this point and 
played a large role in developing the Flemish identity76. 
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These grievances led to the Flemish creating a distinct Flemish identity and culture77.  
Ultimately, when economic circumstances came to be reversed and Flanders became the 
dominant economic power- not to mention the majority population - they found themselves in a 
position where they became the dominant player after years of being second-class.  Thus, they 
began to flex their muscle in government78.  This scared the Walloons, and led to the 1970 
reforms. The historical narratives and divisions between the two groups are clearly seen in the 
negotiation process of the reforms of 1970.  The negotiations quickly became zero-sum 
discussions, with a victory for one side being a loss for the other79.  These zero-sum relationships 
last to this day whenever controversial crises pop up. This is born out of the vast differences 
between the two and the fact that their narratives have made them take hard stances against each 
other. Clearly, there are strong historical narratives among the Flemish.  Through their history, 
they have seen themselves as second-class citizens, and this forced them to create a national 
identity that sets them apart from the rest of the country, and when they finally did reach a 
dominant position, this led them to take actions that would further put them on top. The 
Walloons are aware of this antagonism, and thus they become worried about Flemish retribution 
when they act in a majoritarian fashion.  This makes for a tense society and political system. 
 In the case of the French-speakers, the narratives are not as strong.  Possibly due to their 
previous status as the dominant power, they did not embark on the same nation-building project 
that the Flemish did.  The other reason for this is that the French-speakers are split between two 
regions and despite their similar language, have different cultures.  Wallonia was the industrial 
heart of the country and frequently voted for the Socialist party, whereas the Brussels-Capital 
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region was a government and business centre that voted for the Liberals.  Thus, despite their 
common French-language, they do not share a completely similar culture, leading to the French 
nation-building project not being as successful as the Flemish80.  
 There are some symbols that help unify Belgium, such as the monarchy, but just as in the 
Netherlands this plays a dangerous role, as when controversy arises it has the potential to 
destabilize society.  Other aspects, such as success at the Olympics or when the Belgian national 
soccer team does well provides some form of unifying force as well81.  As has become 
abundantly clear, unlike the Netherlands, they are not united along linguistic lines and clearly 
this has become the biggest cleavage in the Belgian system.  Unfortunately, unlike the 
Netherlands, there are not as many unifying aspects in Belgian society, although one should not 
underestimate those that do exist. 
 Ultimately, the Belgian case is not as optimistic as the Netherlands.  In the Netherlands, 
the narratives did not pit the identity groups against one another.  In Belgium, one group has a 
strong narrative of being second class citizens, and this has pushed their identity to evolve the 
way it has – with Flemish nationalist parties calling for secession being very successful.  The 
French narrative may not be as cohesive as that of the Flemish, but they still react strongly to the 
perceived encroachment of the Flemish on their identity rights, and this causes tension in the 
political system.  This antagonism between the identity groups is not something the Dutch had to 
contend with in their political system. 
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3.1.3 – Lebanon 
 Lebanon presents another clear case of a country with deeply engrained antagonistic 
historical narratives among the identity groups. As mentioned, this is a deeply divided society 
and there is no one national identity.  The primordial religious identities are stronger.  This is 
born from the arguably arbitrary creation of Lebanon.  It was initially part of the Greater Syrian 
province within the Ottoman Empire.  When this empire was dissolved after World War 1, the 
British and French gained control over its former territories.  The idea was that, under the 
Mandate system, they would help guide them to eventual independence82.  Through this system, 
the French granted their long-time allies – the Maronites – the nation-state that they had desired 
for many years.  Unfortunately, to make it a viable entity, they included a number of 
predominantly Muslim areas, leaving the Maronites as a minority in their own state83.  The desire 
for an independent state was unique to the Maronites, as the others desired different 
arrangements, such as the Sunni desire to be part of a pan-Arab or Greater Syrian state as they 
would be the majority population in such an entity84.  Ultimately, the Lebanese state was a 
Maronite project that the other communities rejected to varying degrees. 
This would play significantly into the creation of distinct historical narratives within 
Lebanon. From the outset, the segments had opposing ideas about the shape that the state should 
take.  Then, when the Maronites continued to play a dominant role within the political system, 
the narratives of the other communities came to reflect the feeling of being second-class 
citizens85.  This was also compounded by the emergence of Arab Nationalism as a driving force 
in Middle Eastern politics.  This ideology opposed the arbitrary nature of the borders drawn by 
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the western powers, and called for a unified Arab state86.  This found considerable traction 
among the disenfranchised communities within Lebanon and further strengthened their 
narratives.  The Muslims, primarily Sunni, rejected the Lebanese state and wished for its 
dissolution into something else, and the Maronites desperately desired to cling to power.   
 These narratives would play a large role in the onset of the civil war and its longevity.  
Ultimately, when the civil war ended, the experiences before and during the conflict further 
entrenched these historical narratives pitting the identity groups of Lebanon against one 
another87.  These historical narratives have incredible power to this day and push the segments to 
protect their status at all costs.  Unfortunately, in Lebanon there is a lack of unifying symbols 
that may pull the disparate groups together.  These separate and antagonistic identities make 
working together difficult and contribute significantly to an unstable and tense society. 
3.1.4 – Comparison 
 As can be seen, there is a disparity in the historical narratives of the three consociational 
states.  In the Netherlands, the narratives create separate segments, but they are not antagonistic 
and do not pit the groups against one another.  No one has a lasting narrative of being 
disenfranchised and needing to fight to maintain status.  This is not the case in the other two 
states.  In both Belgium and Lebanon, there are communities – the Flemish and the Muslims– 
who have formative experiences where they were perceived to be treated as second-class citizens 
who needed to fight for equal treatment in areas like political representation or economic 
development.  These experiences paint the historical narratives of the group in an antagonistic 
light, thus making cooperation more difficult and increasing tensions in society. 
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 This is a noteworthy difference between the cases that can contribute to de-consociational 
transition.  For a de-consociational transition to take place, the underlying reasons for a 
consociational democracy – the tensions and divisions within a society - need to be dealt with.  
These antagonisms can significantly increase the tensions in the society, and thus hinders the 
prospects for de-consociational transition.  It is thus noteworthy that the one state that did 
transition from a consociational democracy – the Netherlands – did not have these historical 
antagonisms.   
The case of Belgium warrants further discussion as well.  As was mentioned, Belgium 
had two consociational periods.  The first dealt with the religious/socio-economic division and 
the second dealt with the ethno-linguistic division.  The first division did not have strong 
historical narratives – like the Netherlands – and it saw a transition away from a consociational 
system along these lines to a new system.  This shows that consociational systems centred on 
divisions that do not have antagonistic narratives have an easier chance of transitioning.  
Unfortunately, the ethno-linguistic division was latent and came to the forefront, forcing a new 
consociational system.  Ultimately, it is clear that antagonistic narratives impact the de-
consociational prospects of a state.  
CHAPTER 4 – OVERALL ELITE LEADERSHIP 
   
Lijphart notes that as important as the institutional measures to facilitate consociational 
democracy are, it is the conscious decision of the elites to work together and overcome their 
differences for the good of society that keeps consociational democracy going.  The elites need 
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to be aware of the dangers of the divisions and treat politics as a serious business, rather than a 
game to be played between rivals. 
 Lijphart noted that there are three conditions that are conducive to the maintenance of 
elite cooperation.  The first is the existence of external threats which motivate the elite cartel to 
work together to resolve the crisis88.  It was noted in Chapter 2 that all three states in this study 
faced some form of external threat which motivated the elites to come together and govern in a 
consociational fashion.  The second condition Lijphart notes as contributing to elite cooperation 
is a multiple balance of power among the subcultures89.  This refers to all segments of the 
population being minorities and no one group being able to overpower the others.  This will be 
discussed in more depth in this chapter and its implication on elite leadership.  The final 
condition that Lijphart noted that contributes to the ability of the elites to cooperate is there being 
relatively few loads on the system that could strain relations among the elites90.  This will be 
discussed in depth in the next chapter. 
 In order for a state to achieve de-consociational transition, the underlying divisions and 
tensions need to be dealt with.  The prudent leadership of the elites is the primary way in which 
issues are dealt with, compromise is reached, and peace is maintained between the groups.  If 
one group is seen to be acting in a self-serving or majoritarian manner, or if one segment is 
isolated outright, that will have dire consequences on the tensions in society, thus impacting the 
prospect of de-consociational transition.  This means that the prudent leadership of the elites 
must be studied to understand why some states transition while others do not. 
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 4.1.0 - Were the elites able to come together to rule prudently day-to-day? 
4.1.1 – The Netherlands  
 Overall, the Dutch elite were excellent at coming together to rule prudently, which was 
helped in part by the multiple balance of power. The Dutch consociational system was a system 
of minority segments91.  This translated into the political system with the Catholic Party and 
Labour parties each receiving around 30% of the vote, and the Liberal and Calvinist parties each 
receiving around 10%92. This forced the parties to work together as they could not rely on 
majoritarian tactics to make decisions. In practice, the Dutch governing strategy was largely 
influenced by the pillarization of society.  In the Netherlands, each segment had their own party 
and organizations, and due to the significant overlap between the two, the elites often represented 
their segments both in civil society and in parliament93. This allowed the elites to rule largely 
through non-transparent, backdoor deals with one another.  Due to the deference of the Dutch 
population, this did not come across as anti-democratic94.  This gave the elites significant 
freedom to deal with one another and compromise in order to maintain stability in the system, 
with little popular interference. 
The principles of consensus and pragmatism/prudence were crucial during the Dutch 
consociational system95. Due to this, there was a significant lack of temptation by the elites to 
use majoritarian tactics while ruling96. They were capable of reflecting the interests of their 
segment and were able to overcome their differences and work together.  The Dutch elite 
realized that there was a significant danger in isolating and ignoring certain segments of the 
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population, so they made efforts to include all important groups in the decision-making process 
and ensured that it was as prudent as possible.  The first and most obvious example of this is the 
formation of the coalition governments.  As was mentioned, coalition governments were 
necessary to rule and the Dutch coalitions were massive. They were almost all surplus-majority, 
and they often represented 75% of the seats in parliament97.  This was a conscious decision by 
the elites to include as many parties in the government as possible in order to rule effectively and 
achieve the desired goal of consensus.   
Prudence is reflected in the technocratic nature of Dutch coalitions.  In Dutch 
governments, cabinet members are not allowed to also sit in the legislature as MPs, and thus if an 
MP were to want to be a cabinet minister, they would have to resign from parliament.  Dutch 
cabinets have thus generally been composed of individuals from outside parliament with 
expertise over their assigned portfolio.  They are members of the party in practice, but not always 
in name98.  This provided a significant separation from parliament and allowed the cabinet to rule 
prudently on important issues.  This separation, however, did cause some tension between 
parliamentary leaders and their respective cabinet ministers, leading to some cabinet crises such 
as in 1951 and 1960.  
Such large coalitions still reduce certain key parties to opposition status, and this could be 
a recipe for disaster. Luckily, there were various opportunities for the opposition to take part in 
the decision-making process.  As was mentioned earlier, the decision-making process was highly 
impacted by the pillarization of Dutch society and the backroom deals that this entails.  These 
deals among rival elites were not limited solely to the parties that were in government.  It 
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frequently involved members of the opposition, as they were still respected parliamentarians 
with their own expertise. Policy-making often took the shape of a market of ideas, with 
government going to various actors, exchanging ideas, and making deals.  This led to a 
remarkably low number of amendments to bills once they were drafted, and most opposition 
members voted in favour of drafted bills99.  The Dutch elite prioritized hearing all views on a 
policy issue and ensured that all segments were involved in the policy-making process rather 
than winning political battles over rivals. 
There is one final area where opposition groups can impact the decision-making process 
– through the use of committees.  Committees have been organized to allow for all segments to 
be represented, regardless of government status, and impact the policy-process.  Chief among 
these, as was mentioned, is the Social and Economic Council. As an advisory panel, it may seem 
relatively inconsequential, but there is an important informal measure that must be stressed.  
Despite it being merely an advisory council, government treated its decisions as future policy. 
This is because this is a body that is composed of representatives of the segments and make 
decisions though consensus.  For government to ignore this would be to ignore the consensus 
reached by the segments. In practice, this council’s power is comparable to that of cabinet or 
parliament100.  This is an important measure in the prudent leadership of the elites.  Despite the 
fact that some segments may not be represented in government, they are represented in the 
various committees, thus providing them with influential access to the decision-making process. 
Clearly, the Netherlands excelled in the area of elite leadership.  The elites recognized the 
danger of isolating certain segments from the decision making process and thus there are various 
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informal measures in place that allow elites that are reduced to opposition status to impact the 
decision-making progress and make the desires of their segment heard.  
4.1.2 – Belgium 
When compared to the Netherlands, the day-to-day leadership of the Belgian elite is not 
quite as prudent.  There is a stronger tendency to using majoritarian strategies to push segmental 
objectives and then using consociational measures to solve the crisis that this causes101.  These 
tendencies may be exacerbated by Belgium’s less favourable balance of power. During the first 
consociational period, the three segments were not evenly powerful.  The Catholics had a natural 
majority as they were dominant in the more populous Flanders region and had some support in 
the rest of the country, while the other two were popular in the less populous regions.  Thus, the 
Catholics had a dominant position in parliament that they took advantage of at times. This was 
usually followed by civil unrest102.   
Belgium’s second consociational period is equally problematic as the linguistic divisions 
are exacerbated by the difference in power between the two groups.  Initially, Wallonia was the 
economic power of the country, but this changed in the 60s103.  Flanders became dominant both 
economically and demographically, leading to there being no multiple balance of power in the 
current system.  The one saving grace is that due to the incredible fragmentation of the Belgian 
party system, no single party comes close to a governing majority104.  Even elites from the same 
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linguistic community frequently find themselves divided on issues105. This hinders the ability of 
the groups to act in a majoritarian fashion, but when the disparate elements of the segments find 
themselves in agreement over certain issues – like linguistic or cultural rights – then the 
majoritarian tendency emerges again.  Clearly, Belgium’s tendency towards majoritarian, anti-
consociational practices emerge partly due to this lack of a multiple balance of power in both 
periods. 
One interesting difference between the Netherlands and Belgium is the level of 
pillarization.  In the Netherlands there was overlap between civil society and the political 
establishment, allowing for back-room deals between the representatives.  In Belgium, however, 
the pillars were less institutionalized, so there was less overlap.  This meant that the pillars did 
not play a large role in the decision-making process106.  Then, as of the 1960s, de-pillarization 
occurred, and the populace began to associate less with the pillar organizations, weakening their 
position even further107. Thus, the political elites are the primary deal-makers in the Belgian 
political system, with the pillars playing a smaller role than in the Netherlands. 
This paints the Belgian system in a dire light, but there are a number of conventions by 
which the elites operate which allowed for prudent decision-making.  One of the most important 
tools is the cabinet.  Unlike the Netherlands, Belgian cabinets are a lot less likely to be surplus-
majority, although their use increased as the linguistic division deepened. It never reached the 
                                                          
105 Dave Sinardet, “From Consociational Consciousness to Majoritarian Myth: Consociational Democracy, Multi-
Level Politics and the Belgian Case of Brussesls-Halle-Vilvoorde,” 352-353 
106 Kris Deschouwer, “And the Peace Goes On? Consociational Democracy and Belgian Politics in the Twenty-First 
Century,” 896-897. 
107 Jaak Billiet, Bart Maddens and Andre-Paul Frognier, “Does Belgium (Still) Exist? Differences in Political 
Culture between Flemings and Walloons,” 913. 
44 
 
same levels as that of the Netherlands, however108.  There are other features of the Belgian 
cabinets that show prudent leadership, such as the linguistic parity and the decision-making 
process.  Due to the clearly divisive issue that language plays in the Belgian system, the elites 
agreed to have Dutch and French-speakers equally represented in the Belgian cabinet.  The 
decision-making structure is also important, as decisions in cabinet are made through consensus 
instead of majority-votes109.  Thus, like the Social and Economic Council in the Netherlands, this 
representation of the major divisions and the use of consensus leads to the decisions made by 
cabinet acting as the reflection of the compromises made by the segments of Belgian society.  
For this reason, the Belgian executive tends to dominate over the legislature110.  This dominance 
does not mean that the government is unchallenged, however. The Belgian legislature is more 
likely to challenge and vote against bills than in the Netherlands, with many more being passed 
along partisan lines.  This has also increased with the deepening divisions along the linguistic 
line111.  This could be seen as a reaction to the lack of all segments being fully represented in the 
cabinet decision-making process, as the cabinets never reached true grand coalition status.  Thus, 
despite the prudent attempts at including as many actors as possible, there is still more opposition 
and tension within the Belgian legislative process than in the Netherlands. 
In the modern era, attempts at finding compromise between the two ethno-linguistic 
groups have decreased. As has been mentioned, the deepening of the ethno-linguistic division led 
to the adoption of constitutional reforms, and this would set the pattern for how crises are 
resolved. Whenever tensions between the two groups get high, it tends to result in a crisis which 
                                                          
108 Rudy B. Andeweg, Lieven De Winter and Wolfgang C. Muller, “Parliamentary Opposition in Post-
Consociational Democracies: Austria, Belgium and the Netherlands,” 90. 
109 Dave Sinardet, “From Consociational Consciousness to Majoritarian Myth: Consociational Democracy, Multi-
Level Politics and the Belgian Case of Brussesls-Halle-Vilvoorde,” 355. 
110 Ibid, 355. 
111 Rudy B. Andeweg, Lieven De Winter and Wolfgang C. Muller, “Parliamentary Opposition in Post-
Consociational Democracies: Austria, Belgium and the Netherlands,” 99-100 
45 
 
is usually resolved by devolving more powers to the regions112.  The Belgian elite more 
frequently resort to devolving powers to the regions whenever tensions get too high rather than 
finding other forms of compromise to deal with the issue at hand. 
The most significant impact on the overall prudent leadership of the Belgian elite is their 
tendency toward majoritarian tactics and the crises it leads to. The specific crises that they led to 
will be discussed more in the next chapter, but suffice it to say that what happened was the 
majoritarian tactics of the elite exacerbated controversial issues, caused crises, and forced 
consociational measures to be used to alleviate tensions113.  This has led to scholars noting that 
Belgium’s consociational practices seemed to come in waves.  There are periods of 
consociational practices, followed by periods of majoritarian practices resulting in a crisis, which 
is then solved with consociational practices again.  The cycle then starts anew.  Thus, in terms of 
overall prudent leadership, Belgium is not as effective as the Netherlands. 
4.1.3 – Lebanon 
As with Belgium, the overall leadership in Lebanon is not as optimistic as that of the 
Netherlands, despite the existence of a multiple balance of power. As was mentioned, Lebanon 
recognizes 18 distinct communities, all with confessional representation in government.  None of 
the communities are a majority114.  Unfortunately for Lebanon, this multiple balance of power 
did not translate perfectly to the political system as certain groups were guaranteed more 
powerful positions than others.  In the first consociational period, the president was clearly the 
most powerful actor in the Lebanese political system, thus giving the Maronite community the 
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ability to exert greater power than their demographic standing would allow115.  In the second 
consociational period, the powers were equalized, essentially providing the top three 
communities veto power due to the powerful positions allotted to them116.  This more closely 
represents the multiple balance of power, as these three communities together represent the 
overwhelming majority of the population. However, given the significant power of these 
positions, there is a greater tendency to using them to stalemate the system in order for the 
community to get their way.  Thus, although the balance of power is better exemplified in the 
second period, it is not perfect. 
As with Belgium, despite the dire prospects for prudent leadership, there were still clear 
examples of the elites coming together and compromising.  Like the Netherlands and Belgium, 
there was clear pillarization in Lebanon.  The Lebanese state has been kept purposely weak in 
order to provide greater autonomy to the communities over various aspects of their life117.  This 
has led to the eminent position of the elite-class within the Lebanese political system.  Like in the 
Netherlands, these elites are the dominant actors within their respective communities’ hierarchy 
and they represent their communities in government.  Unlike the Netherlands, the patron/client 
relationship between the elites and the communities is much more pronounced.  The elites 
utilized the system to gain resources which they then redistributed to their communities for 
support.  Thus, there are few state institutions that provide services to the communities; the elites 
play this role.  Some elites, such as Hezbollah, have become some of the largest service 
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providers in the country118.  This has become one of the primary ways through which deals are 
made within the Lebanese state, through fighting and compromising over resources. 
As with the prior cases, the primary area where elite cooperation happens is through the 
cabinet.  These cabinets are large coalitions often bringing in leaders from all major 
communities, and after the election of President Chehab, the idea of “no victor, no vanquished” 
became crucial119.  This idea reflects the need for large coalitions ruling largely based on 
consensus in order to keep stability within the Lebanese state.  There cannot be a perception that 
some segments are victors and some are losers when a decision has to be made.  Important 
cabinet decisions had to be made with at least a 2/3 vote120.  This, combined with the growing 
number of actors being included in cabinet in order to keep the peace – from 9 in the first cabinet 
to 22 in the last cabinet before the civil war – led to it becoming unwieldy and made decision-
making difficult, as shown by Chehab’s bypassing the cabinet to make decisions with the help of 
aides121.  In the second consociational era, due to the increased divisions between the March 8 
and 14 Alliances, cabinets became even larger – the 2009 cabinet had 30 members122. The 
Lebanese elite recognized the need for large coalition cabinets operating on a near-consensus 
basis in order to keep the peace.  
This strategy worked as the elites were able to keep the peace in a significantly turbulent 
and tense region.  They recognized that they needed to work together.  Informal rules drove elite 
relations in the Lebanese system more than formal rules, and this kept the regime stable for 
longer than one would think based on its internal divisions and external pressures. The regime 
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did collapse in 1975, but it is hard to imagine any way that the elites would have been able to 
save it.  In the second consociational era, there are problems with elite leadership as well, but 
they managed to weather significant regional issues well without collapsing123.  It is important to 
note that this is an incredibly divided country in a very turbulent regional system.  The elites did 
a commendable job at maintaining stability as well as they did124.  
That being said, it is still important to note that there were deficiencies in the prudent 
leadership of the Lebanese elite, as their incredible power led to majoritarian and self-serving 
practices.  The elites utilized the regime as a piggy-bank for their respective communities; as 
they maintained their own power and positions through patron/client networks.  This led to the 
elite stamping down emerging rivals from within their own communities; alienating them and the 
people that they represented125.  In the second consociational period, this became even worse, as 
the top three communities were given powerful positions through which they can essentially rule 
their communities as fiefs.  This has promoted more corruption, as they primarily seek rents from 
the system instead of increased cooperation between communities126.   
As the divisions between March 8 and March 14 deepened, there was an increase in 
stalemates and cabinet crises because the powerful positions are captured by members of 
different alliances – March 14 frequently captures the prime minister, March 8 always captures 
the speaker, and the president has come from both camps.  Thus, instead of compromising and 
working together, the elites frequently utilize the veto and try to force their agenda.  This has led 
to cabinets being very unstable and taking long times to form.  It has also led to significant 
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domestic instability, such as the two year political deadlock that had to be resolved by the 2008 
Doha Accord127.   
These imprudent actions by the elites are causing problems in the current era as well. The 
state has become the financier of the communities, and has failed to rise above the divisions and 
become a true national government128. The patronage has gone too far and is now perceived as 
corruption by large portions of the population, leading to significant mistrust of government129.  
This is clearly seen in 2020 as there are widespread demonstrations rocking Lebanon calling for 
a technocratic government as people are tired of the perceived corruption and mismanagement of 
the country by the elites130.  These demonstrations led to resignations like that of Prime Minister 
Saad Hariri, but at the time of this writing, little has truly changed.  Clearly, despite the existence 
of measures designed to promote the prudent leadership of elites and evidence of prudent 
leadership throughout Lebanon’s history, there are serious deficiencies, especially in the modern 
era. 
4.1.4 – Comparison 
It has become clear that there are some crucial differences between the cases in terms of 
prudent elite leadership.  The Netherlands has the best track record, while Belgium and Lebanon 
have more mixed experiences.  Both have elements of prudent elite leadership, but they are not 
perfect. 
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The first area where the differences are noteworthy is in the multiple balance of power.  
The Netherlands exemplifies the best-case-scenario, with a clear multiple balance of power.  No 
one segment can claim a majority status and thus there is no possibility for them to attempt 
majoritarian practices.  Lebanon also has a multiple balance of power, but unfortunately the way 
in which the political institutions are organized give significant power to certain communities 
allowing them to act in more majoritarian and self-serving ways.  Belgium is the only state 
where there is no multiple balance of power. The Catholics in the first period and the Flemish in 
the second are demographically dominant which allows for the possibility of majoritarian 
practices to emerge within government.  The issues that Lebanon and Belgium have with a 
multiple balance of power go a long way to explaining their tendencies toward majoritarian and 
self-serving practices. 
The ways in which the elites cooperate and work together is also important.  The 
Netherlands had many conventions which led to government seeking consensus and pragmatism 
in the decision-making process.  From large coalitions to the ample opportunities afforded to the 
opposition allowed for all important actors to take part in the decision-making process.  Luckily, 
it was understood by the elites that all viewpoints must be listened to and consensus be reached 
for the stability of society.  This was not always the case in Belgium and Lebanon.  Both have 
noteworthy measures that were utilized to allow the elites to rule prudently, such as through large 
coalitions, but unfortunately both their elites have tendencies to be more self-serving and seek to 
further their own interests.  Ultimately, this has negative repercussions on the decision-making 
process and leads to significant political instability.  Crises emerged and were exacerbated by the 
majoritarian tendencies of the elites, further dividing society. 
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The issue of prudent elite leadership and the differences between the cases goes a long 
way to explaining the phenomena of de-consociational transition.  Again, in order for a state to 
undergo this transition, the underlying reasons for consociationalism need to be dealt with.  The 
divisions and tensions within society must be mediated by the elites. Thus, if the system is 
marked by poor cooperation, the political system and society as a whole can be destabilized. This 
has negative repercussions on the prospects for de-consociational transition as shown by the 
experiences of the three cases.  The Netherlands had a positive experience with elites who ruled 
prudently and managed to come together and compromise with rivals from other segments.  This 
led to a very stable political system with few major crises in government.  They saw divisions 
diminish, and experienced a de-consociational transition.  The other two cases had more 
problems; their elites ruled prudently at times, but they also had tended to use majoritarian 
strategies more frequently, which destabilized society. Their societies remained divided, and they 
did not undergo a de-consociational transition.  
Ultimately, all three states showed prudent leadership, but to varying degrees.  The 
Netherlands stands out as the one of the clearest example of how elites should operate, while 
both Belgium and Lebanon have significant deficiencies which hindered their own stability.  
This contributes to the differences in de-consociational transition. 
CHAPTER 5 – LOADS ON THE SYSTEM 
 
 As has been mentioned, there are three factors that contribute to the elites’ ability to come 
together and rule prudently.  This chapter will deal with the factor that stands the biggest chance 
at disrupting the whole consociational experience – the existence of loads on the system.  
Lijphart stated that although an external threat can help mobilize the elites to cooperate in a 
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consociational fashion, too much threat destabilizes the system.  When the threats become too 
dire, it makes it much more difficult for the elites to work together131.  Because elites have to be 
able to meet the interests of their segment, when the segments are very divided by controversial 
issues, it becomes difficult for the elites to reflect this and compromise with one another.132 This 
can seriously impact the stability of society.  Thus, as it is necessary to deal with the underlying 
divisions and tensions in order to undergo a de-consociational transition, it is important to 
discuss these loads.  They, by their very nature of being controversial, increase the tensions and 
divisions in society, thereby impacting the prospects for de-consociational transition. 
5.1.0 - Were there loads on the system, and if so, how were they dealt with? 
5.1.1 – The Netherlands 
 One of the most noteworthy characteristics of the Dutch consociational period is its 
stability.  There were periods with tense political issues, but by and large there were few loads on 
their system.  As was mentioned earlier, tensions arose due to the distance between parliament 
and cabinet, and when these crises did occur, it happened between the parliamentary party and its 
representative in cabinet.  There was more intraparty conflict than interparty conflict during the 
consociational period133.  There was interparty conflict within the coalition cabinets, but this 
frequently took the form of intense policy deliberation over key issues and lasted an average of a 
month and a half134.  Tensions emerged between parties, but they were not strenuous loads.   
 There is one instance where a controversial issue divided society quite significantly – the 
question of Princess Irene’s conversion to Catholicism.  As was mentioned earlier, the Dutch 
royal family is a strong unifying symbol, but when controversies arise it can cause problems.  In 
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1964, Princess Irene, who was second in line for the throne, converted to Roman Catholicism to 
marry a Spanish nobleman.  This starkly divided the blocs because until this point the royal 
family had been Calvinist.  Now, a royal who is second in line for the throne has become 
Catholic, possibly changing the royal family’s religious orientation were she to become queen.  
Predictably, the Catholic bloc was overwhelmingly in favour of this, and the Calvinists were 
against it135.  In order to deal with the crisis, an ad hoc council - the Irene Quartet - was 
instituted.  It consisted of four cabinet ministers representing the four parties in government.  The 
Labour party was not included as they were in opposition, but informally, the quartet was in 
close touch with the Labour leadership136.  This shows the prudent leadership of the elites as they 
recognized the dangers that this issue posed, and they utilized the grand coalition to deal with it.  
The solution they came up with was a result of compromise and cooperation. According 
to the Dutch constitution, all royal engagements have to be approved by parliament, or else they 
lose their royal status and place in the line of succession.  Thus, parliament declined to give 
approval to this marriage, taking Irene out of the line of succession.  They claimed it was 
because of the Spanish prince’s involvement in Spanish politics, which was deemed 
inappropriate for the consort of a possible queen of the Netherlands who is to remain 
apolitical137.  This dealt with the issue in a political manner without drawing attention to the 
religious aspect of the conflict.  Ultimately, helped by the incredible deference of the Dutch 
populace, the issue was dealt with and society stabilized. 
Ultimately, the Netherlands has not had to deal with any significant loads.  They naturally 
had to deal with governmental tensions and the Irene issue – but this was dealt with quickly and 
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competently - but other than that, the Dutch experience was remarkably stable. The Netherlands 
clearly has had luck on its side; unfortunately, the same cannot be said of Belgium and Lebanon. 
5.1.2 – Belgium  
Belgium has had a number of loads that significantly strained the system and divided 
society.  As it borders the Netherlands, it shares their luck in that it resides in a very stable 
regional system post-World War 2, but there were more domestic controversies that strained the 
system.   
The first major issue was the Royal Question.  The crisis lasted from 1944-1950, with it 
coming to a head in the last year.  It started with the Nazi occupation of Belgium during World 
War 2 when King Leopold III decided to stay in the country and form a government under 
German occupation and was accused of being too friendly with the Nazis138.  When Belgium was 
liberated, the King had been taken by German forces and his brother became regent.  The 
Catholics defended the return of the king, while the Liberals and Socialists did not. The 
Catholics, who formed government with a single-party majority, decided to use a referendum to 
decide, winning an absolute majority of 57%.  However, regionally, there was only a majority in 
Flanders – which is decidedly Catholic – and not in Brussels and Wallonia.  When the king 
returned, there were street demonstrations leading to the deaths of three people139.  Eventually, a 
summit of the three parties was created and a compromise was decided suggesting that the king 
abdicate the throne in favour of his son Baudouin140.  The plan was followed, reducing tensions.   
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What this crisis shows is that there are stronger tendencies toward majoritarian strategies 
in Belgian democracy – through the formation of a single-party government and the referendum 
result only being majority in favour in one of the three regions - and this inflamed an already 
tense societal issue.  The elites’ inability to deal with it in a prudent, consociational manner from 
the outset inflamed those tensions.  
The next major issue that divided Belgium was the School War, which occurred from 
1954-1958.  In countries divided by religion, the ability to attend denominational schools is very 
important.  This issue had always been a tense point in Belgian consociationalism and came to a 
head during this period. Right after the Catholics lost their parliamentary majority, a government 
was formed with the Liberals and Socialists united in their desire to protect the public school 
system from Catholic schools by boosting their funding.  This led to a large mobilisation of the 
Catholic pillar against these measures.  Again, this was resolved by a three-party summit 
utilizing proportionality; they instituted a proportional distribution of finances between the two 
school systems and a three-party commission to monitor future educational policy141.  This 
shows once again the tensions that arise when majoritarian actions are taken against a segment.  
In this case, the secular parties combined forces to act in a manner that the Catholics did not 
agree with, creating significant tensions within the system.  Had they resolved to use 
consociational manners to deal with this issue from the outset, there may not have been a tense 
four year period.  
When the consociational system shifted to reflect the ethno-linguistic divide, there were 
many mini-crises142.  Most of them were resolved by devolving more powers to the regions.  
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There is one issue, however, which exemplifies the intense divisions and relatively poor ability 
of the elites to deal with controversial loads – the case of Brussels-Halle-Vilvoorde (BHV), 
which dominated Belgian politics from 2002-2012.   
BHV was a unique electoral district in Belgium.  Most districts have their language 
decided based on the region it is in – in Flanders it is Dutch, and Wallonia it is French. BHV was 
bilingual, in order to represent the bilingual nature of Brussels.  This means that whichever 
candidate is elected chose which language to represent143.  This district was composed of 19 
municipalities of the bilingual Brussels-Capital region, and 35 municipalities of Flemish-
Brabant144.  This was very controversial, as the Flemish disliked the perceived “Frenchification” 
of possibly having French candidates elected from their region.  They would prefer the two to be 
split and Halle-Vilvoorde be a Flemish district, but the French community did not want to lose 
the French minority living there145.   This had been a source of friction since the constitutional 
reforms of 1970, and in 2002 the Supreme Court ruled that parliament needed to solve the 
problem146.  It was not resolved until 2012. 
This dominated Belgian politics for so long because the elites were unable to come 
together and compromise to solve the issue. After the Supreme Court decision, the Flemish 
wanted to use majoritarian strategies in order to split BHV, but the Alarm Bell procedure was 
threatened. This led them to hold off on discussions on the issue until after the 2007 election147.  
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This would prove to be a mistake, as after this election, it took 194 days for government to be 
formed, a record at the time.  Even then, no solution was found148.  It took until after the 
elections in 2011 for it to be resolved, but it took 541 days for government to be formed and the 
compromise to be reached149.  It required a massive reform of the Belgian state in order to satisfy 
all parties in the compromise. This agreement turned BHV into two separate districts with Halle-
Vilvoorde being included in the Flemish-Brabant electoral district and the creation of a separate 
Brussels-Capital district150.  This solution finally solved the crisis which had been present in 
Belgian politics in some form or another since 1970 and was especially tense for a decade. 
Clearly, this crisis is one that was largely aggravated by elites.  Throughout the entire 
process, parties on both sides made compromise difficult.  Part of this was because the elites 
were much more extreme in their views on federal reform than their constituents151.  This led to 
them attempting majoritarian tactics to try and get their way.  The unwillingness to compromise 
is shown by the record for longest government formation being broken twice during the process.  
This issue had been divisive in Belgian politics for a long time, but the failure of the elites to deal 
with it prudently made it significantly more difficult to solve. 
It is clear that Belgium has faced many loads during its years as a consociational 
democracy.  As controversial as these loads were, the elites made the situation worse by failing 
to compromise and attempting majoritarian practices, causing significant tensions in society. 
                                                          
148 Dave Sinardet, “Belgian Federalism Put to the Test: The 2007 Belgian Federal Elections and their Aftermath,” 
1025-1026. 
149 Jurgen Goossens and Pieter Cannoot, “Belgian Federalism after the Sixth State Reform,” Perspectives on 
Federalism 7, no. 2 (2015), 31. 
150 Ibid, 35-36. 
151 Min Reuchamps, Dave Sinardet, Jé Dodeigne, and Didier Caluwaerts, “Reforming Belgium’s Federalism: 
Comparing the Views of MPs and Voters,” Government and Opposition 52, no. 3 (2017), 478-479 
58 
 
5.1.3 – Lebanon 
Out of the three cases, Lebanon has had to deal with the most extreme loads. What is 
unique about the Lebanese loads is that they were largely inflamed by external pressures.  
Lebanon is located in a tense regional system, and many of these regional tensions fall along 
ideological and ethno-religious lines. Thus, Lebanon is the perfect battleground for those 
conflicts. This inflames the divisions already present within Lebanese society, leading to 
significant domestic conflict and has negative repercussions for de-consociational transition. 
As was mentioned earlier, there was no consensus in Lebanon on what shape the state 
should take, with some arguing for it to be part of a Greater Syrian or Pan-Arab state.  This latter 
position was what was promised and advocated by the Arab Nationalist movement under the 
leadership of Gamal Abdel Nasser of Egypt.  He argued that the Arab world was united by a 
common language and historical experience of colonization by the west.  He argued that the 
Arab world should unite under one entity152.  This was an incredibly powerful movement in the 
Middle East until the end of the 1960s, and it caused existential crises for states as many regimes 
fell to the Arab Nationalist cause. 
Due to Lebanon’s domestic divisions, this movement found fertile ground. As was 
outlined, the Lebanese state was a largely Maronite project, so many of the other communities 
saw the Arab Nationalist movement as an ideal alternative to Maronite hegemony. Some of the 
largest proponents of this were the Sunni Muslims as they played a secondary position in 
Lebanon but would be the majority in a greater Arab state. At this time, there was also a 
significant wealth disparity between the wealthy urban areas and the poorer rural communities 
that were perceived to be ignored by the elites.  Unfortunately, this tension was also religious 
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with the Maronites being widely perceived as the wealthy groups and the Muslims as more 
disadvantaged153.  These two tensions ultimately came to a head in 1958 with a brief civil war 
that required American troops to create peace between the communities154. 
What this crisis showed is that these loads were difficult for the Lebanese elite to deal 
with, but they also highlight weaknesses in elite leadership.  The state was purposely kept weak 
to give power to the elites but this came at the cost of the ability of the state to solve these 
economic issues155.  This caused further grievances that would be exploited by the Arab 
Nationalist movement. Also, as the elites were divided on this controversial issue, it halted the 
decision-making process as they could not come up with a solution.  These weaknesses were 
recognized, and part of the resolution of the 1958 crisis was the ascendancy of General Fuad 
Chehab to the presidency.  This was the first time someone not of the elite class took this 
position, and his tenure marked a significant shift towards more pragmatic leadership as they 
focused on social programs in order to alleviate the economic tensions and increasing the power 
of the state over the elites.  His outsider status also helped perceptions against the extensive 
power of the elite-class Maronites156.  Thus, there was clearly recognition of the problems posed 
by the elites when dealing with this crisis and there were attempts to solve it.  Unfortunately, the 
next crisis would be so intense that it would completely destroy the system and leave the country 
in a civil war for 15 years. 
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The most significant crisis that the Lebanese state had to weather was the presence of 
Palestinian militias and their attacks on Israel from within their borders.  Due to the Arab/Israeli 
crisis, there was a large amount of Palestinian militias attacking Israel from within bordering 
countries.  After the 1967 war, many Arab states pushed the militias out of their countries.  
Eventually, these states forced Lebanon to accept the 1969 Cairo Agreement which allowed 
Palestinian militias autonomy within the refugee camps in Lebanon157.  Lebanon already housed 
a large amount of Palestinian refugees from both the 1948 diaspora and after the 1967 war, and 
their presence was a divisive issue within Lebanon because the groups did not agree on how to 
deal with them158.  Some groups – largely the Sunnis – wanted to support the Palestinians in their 
fight against Israel or provide them with Lebanese citizenship.  On the other hand, other 
communities sympathised with them but did not want to get involved in the fight or give the 
majority-Sunni refugees citizenship, as it would severely disrupt the tense demographic 
balance159.   Regardless, the presence of these militias in Lebanon and their war against Israel 
slowly began to deteriorate the security situation in Lebanon.  
When the Palestinians attacked Israel, Israel would destroy Lebanese infrastructure as 
retaliation for “housing” the Palestinians160.  Naturally, this divided the elites.  They were getting 
pushed to further extremes as the Israeli retaliations did more and more damage.  Also, economic 
disparities and the weakness of the state were once again prevalent issues as President Franjieh 
had undone many of the measures imposed by Chehab161.  As the state was incredibly weak and 
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the security situation was deteriorating, militias began to emerge among the Lebanese 
communities162.  All of these pressures led to the collapse of the system in 1975.  
This period is the ultimate example of the problems that can be posed by loads on the 
system.  The period from 1967-1975 in Lebanon was one of constant tension as the societal 
pressures continued to increase and exacerbate each other.  The actions of the elites at times 
made these problems even worse – such as Franjieh ending the Chehabist policies.  
Unfortunately, it is hard to see any possible route the elites could have taken to keep the state 
together.  What this period highlights is the incredible havoc that can be wrought by extreme 
loads.  There is a point when the loads on the system become so intense that no amount of 
prudent action by the elites can help. 
In 1990, the civil war was ended with the Ta’if Accord, but this would institute another 
load on the system that severely constrains elite leadership – the institutionalization of foreign 
intervention.  As was mentioned, Lebanon was a perfect battleground for regional tensions, even 
more so during the civil war.  The civil war was fought by identity-based militias and they found 
allies in foreign patrons who provided them with resources. Most famously, Hezbollah was 
created and funded by Iran.  Thus, these militias developed deep networks between them and 
their foreign patrons163.  At the end of the civil war, these militias were forced to put down their 
guns – with the exception of Hezbollah - but in return they would become legitimate actors.  
These militias entered the system as new zu’ama for the second consociational era, but the 
relations with foreign patrons continued.  This has led to these foreign actors having considerable 
influence over the domestic Lebanese political system through their client parties.  Also, 
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according to the Ta’if Accord, Syria would have effective control over Lebanon, and this would 
continue until they were forced out of the country in 2005164.  After they left, the political system 
shifted and now there are two major alliances of parties – the March 8 and the March 14 
Alliances165.  This shows how important international allegiances are. 
What this means for the Lebanese political system is that the key actors have been 
captured by foreign powers.  The dominant Sunni zaim is the Hariri family which has close ties 
to Saudi Arabia, and the two dominant Shia zu’ama - Hezbollah and Amal - are close to Iran and 
Syria respectively.  This means that cooperation between the elites is no longer solely a matter of 
having to deal with domestic communal tensions, but they also have to balance regional issues.  
The domestic Lebanese political system has become a primary battleground for foreign powers.  
This is not as overt a crisis as foreign militias operating within their soil, but international 
orientation has always been a controversial issue, so its institutionalization raises tensions and 
hurts the leadership abilities of the elites. 
Clearly, Lebanon has faced many loads that have placed great strains on their system.  At 
times, the elites led prudently to help defuse the tensions, but other times their actions have made 
the problems worse or been unable to help.  Regardless, it is important to note that the instability 
of the Lebanese system is not inherently a sign of poorly functioning government, but caused by 
the extreme external loads that the Middle East regional system places on it. 
5.1.4 – Comparison 
This is another area where the experiences of the three consociational democracies were 
wildly different. The Netherlands was extremely lucky in that it had no real loads to deal with.  
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With the exception of the Irene crisis, there were no issues that significantly divided society and 
raised tensions. Ultimately, the smooth Dutch experience can partially be attributed to the lack of 
major loads straining the system.  The same cannot be said of Belgium and Lebanon.  Belgium 
faced controversial issues that originated domestically and were exacerbated by poor leadership 
by the elites.  Lebanon’s loads were foreign in nature and strained the domestic divisions to a 
breaking point.  In Lebanon, although there are examples of less-than-prudent actions by the 
elites, the elites largely tried to save the regime, but the loads were simply beyond what they 
could deal with.  In Belgium, the elites largely saw these issues as ways to push through the 
interests of their segment, and used consociational means to defuse the crisis that emerged. 
The loads that strain a political system are crucial to understanding the prospect of de-
consociational transition. Dealing with the divisions and tensions within society is necessary to 
undergo this transition, and thus any sort of controversy that increases those tensions and 
divisions will run counter to that goal. This is shown by the three cases.  The Netherlands only 
had one significantly controversial issue to deal with, and it was dealt with prudently before it 
could destabilize society further.  Later on, they underwent a de-consociational transition. The 
other two cases are a different story.  Both Belgium and Lebanon had incredible loads to deal 
with throughout their consociational experience, and these significantly increased the tensions 
and divisions within society.  In Belgium it led to the system becoming increasingly divided 
along the ethno-linguistic cleavage with the regions becoming more powerful, and in Lebanon it 
led to the complete collapse of the system and a civil war for 15 years - the repercussions of 
which are still felt to this day.  This shows that the loads on a political system have an incredible 
impact on the divisions in a society, thus impacting the possibilities for a de-consociational 
transition.  Ultimately, a state with few loads will fare better than one with many. 
64 
 
CHAPTER 6 – WHAT HAPPENED TO THE DIVISIONS? 
 
 Because consociational democracies are designed to deal with societal divisions, it is 
logical to assume that a state will not undergo transition if they have not been diminished to an 
acceptable degree.  These divisions would continue to wreak havoc in society and need 
consociational measures to mediate them.  Thus, one needs to measure what happened to the 
divisions in consociational democracies over time. 
6.1.0 - What Happened to the Divisions Over Time? 
 6.1.1 – The Netherlands  
 In the Netherlands the divisions were diminished to such a degree that a consociational 
democracy was no longer necessary166.  Some scholars point to the industrialization and 
economic prosperity of the Netherlands leading to a change in values away from traditional 
church doctrine causing a diminishing of divisions along the religious cleavage167.  Increasing 
economic prosperity would also ease the tensions along the socio-economic cleavage as more 
people found their standard of living increasing.  The Netherlands has some of the highest 
standards of living in the world, thus contributing to that division’s decline168. Regardless, what 
is important to note is that by 1967, the Netherlands’ divisions had been reduced to such an 
extent that a consociational democracy was no longer necessary to mediate them169.   
This lessening of divisions is a permanent feature of the Dutch system, as religion still 
plays a remarkably small role in Dutch society.  According to polls conducted between 2010 and 
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2014, the importance of religion in citizens’ daily life in the Netherlands was very low, with only 
10.7% saying it is “very important” and 14.5% saying it is ”rather important”.  On the other 
hand, 28.9% say it is “not very important”, and 43.8% say it is “not at all important”170.  That is 
incredible for a country whose political system was centered on religious divisions. Another poll 
conducted by the same organization showed that membership to churches has become 
remarkably low as well. During the consociational era, churches were the primary organization 
through which the religious pillars mobilized supporters, and thus decreasing church attendance 
and affiliation would mark a significant decrease in the divisions supporting the consociational 
system.  The poll found that 70.1% were “not a member” and 18.8% were “inactive members”, 
while only 10.9% claimed to be an “active member”171.  This reflects the de-pillarization that 
occurred toward the end of their consociational mandate.  Citizens began to associate less with 
their pillars as the divisions in society diminished.  Clearly, the religious divisions have 
diminished to a negligible amount.   
There is one final indicator of the declining divisions within Dutch society – the 
emergence of the Christian Democratic Appeal (CDA) in the 70s.  This party is a combination of 
the Catholic party and the two Protestant parties172.  As the religious division was the primary 
dividing feature of the Dutch consociational system, the fact that the three religious parties 
combined to form one party speaks volumes.  This would never have happened during the 
consociational era and it speaks to the decreasing divisions in the Netherlands as there is now 
enough common ground between them to form one party.  Clearly, the Netherlands saw a 
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significant reduction of divisions and has reached a point where the divisions in society that once 
divided them are no longer an issue. 
6.1.2 – Belgium  
In Belgium, the first consociational era was much like the Netherlands, with divisions 
along religious and socio-economic lines, and scholars pointing to the economic prosperity 
throughout the 20th century leading to a decrease in religious affiliation173.  There is one 
difference however.  At the end of the School Issue in 1958, the religious leaders seemed to 
make a serious effort to decrease the animosity along religious cleavage, decreasing the divisions 
even quicker174.  Thus, like the Netherlands, the religious differences diminished significantly 
and the socio-economic issues were being dealt with.  It looked like Belgium was on track to 
follow the Netherlands’ trajectory, but one factor made it so that this could not happen– the 
existence of the ethno-linguistic division175. 
Unfortunately, Belgium remains bitterly divided between Dutch-speaking Flanders and 
French-speaking Wallonia.  These divisions are not helped by the nationalist and at-times 
separatist rhetoric that emerges from Flanders, as shown by the incredible success of Flemish 
nationalist and separatist parties176.  The periods of crises have almost always been resolved by 
devolving more powers to the regions, leading to the federal government being fairly weak and 
acting as a battleground for the two ethno-linguistic groups to further their own interests. This 
then heightens divisions. Also, the party system is divided regionally; there are no national 
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parties, further hindering any sort of national consensus-building177.  The two communities live 
almost entirely separate lives and only really interact at the federal level.  Each community has a 
strong sense of nationalism as well.  It is important to note that the groups still identify with 
Belgium to a degree.  In Flanders, 42.8% claim they are as much Fleming as Belgian, and in 
Wallonia 39.1% claim they are equally Walloon as they are Belgian. In Flanders only 31.3% 
claim they are more Fleming than Belgian, and in Wallonia 11.9% claim they are more Walloon 
than Belgian178.  Thus, there remains some form of Belgian identification, but it is a hyphenated 
identity – Fleming-Belgian or Walloon-Belgian.  All of these factors lead to the ethno-linguistic 
divisions in Belgium remaining quite strong. 
Unlike the Netherlands, Belgium has not had the same success with diminishing its 
divisions.  They managed to reduce their religious and socio-economic divisions to a point where 
it was no longer dividing Belgian society, but the ethno-linguistic division emerged stronger than 
ever.  This division remains to this day and continues to divide Belgian society 
6.1.3 – Lebanon 
Unlike Belgium and the Netherlands, Lebanon did not see any reduction in its divisions.  
Out of the three cases, the divisions that first divided the Lebanese system are the ones that 
remain to this day. 
The reason for the longevity of these divisions is due to the civil war and the regional 
system Lebanon finds itself in.  The civil war, although initially driven more by ideology and 
conflict over reformation of the system, eventually was fought entirely along identity lines.  Each 
group had their own militia and civilians relied on them for protection and the provision of 
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services.  These relations would be transferred to the new system when these militias became 
legitimate political actors179.  Also of note is that due to the intense violence during the civil war, 
significant grievances between the groups emerged, which further divided the system.  The 
international regional system is also significant.  As was mentioned, the Middle East is quite 
tense and divided along identity lines, and these tensions play out in Lebanon, further 
heightening and entrenching the religious identities.  This is reflected in the political system 
through the March 8 and March 14 alliances.  March 8 is captured by the Shia community, and 
March 14 is dominated by the Sunni community, with the Maronites being split between the 
two180.  These alliances further divide the communities and harm any attempts at working 
together. 
Recent polling from 2010-2014 shows the importance that religion continues to play in 
Lebanon.  52.9% say that religion remains ‘very important’ in their daily life and 24.1% claim it 
is ‘rather important’.  On the other hand, only 11.8% say it is ‘not very important’ and only 8.2% 
claim it is ‘not at all important’181.  This is a significant difference from the Netherlands where it 
was the exact opposite, where religion became remarkably unimportant.  A second poll 
conducted during the same period reveals even more.  This one asked whether the respondent 
trusts someone of another religion.  Only 9.6% trust someone from another religion ‘completely’ 
and 38.8% trust them ‘somewhat’, while 30.7% do not trust them very much and 17.3% do “not 
trust them at all”182.  There is almost an even split between people trusting and not trusting a 
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fellow citizen solely on the basis of their religion.  This shows that there are still strong 
animosities among people of other religions and can explain the tensions that remain in Lebanon. 
It is clear that in the case of Lebanon, the divisions have not diminished at all.  The 
divisions that forced the elites to come together to establish the consociational system in 1943 
continue to this day. 
6.1.4 – Comparison 
The Netherlands is unique in seeing its divisions diminish and no longer causing tensions 
in the political system.  Belgium had a similar trajectory with its religious and socio-economic 
divisions, but, unfortunately, the ethno-linguistic divisions remained to cause problems in 
Belgian society. They remain divided along this cleavage to this day.  Lebanon is the only case 
where the initial divisions did not diminish and continue to divide society. 
Ultimately, this is one of the crucial differences that help to explain de-consociational 
transition.  The societal divisions were what forced these cases to introduce consociational 
measures in order to help stabilize society, and thus the lessening of these divisions would be a 
necessary condition to the transition away from consociational democracy. They do not need to 
fully disappear, as all societies remain divided along certain lines, but they need to diminish to 
the point where they do not destabilize society to an extreme degree.  As has been shown through 
this study, the Netherlands has had a positive experience in the factors that could help or hinder 
the reduction of their divisions – the segments have no antagonistic narratives, there was a strong 
tradition of prudent elite leadership, and there were few loads on the system – and thus, they 
were able to reduce the divisions and tensions in society and undergo a de-consociational 
transition.  On the other hand, Belgium and Lebanon had less positive track records – with strong 
antagonistic narratives among the segments, poorer elite leadership, and many more extreme 
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loads on the system. Thus, their society remained tense, and their divisions were not able to 
diminish.  With these divisions remaining strong, they were also unable to undergo a de-
consociational transition 
CHAPTER 7 – DE-CONSOCIATIONAL TRANSITION 
 
 As Lijphart notes, consociational democracy is not always a permanent solution.  It is a 
system of government that is used to mediate significant societal difference.  As these societies 
change, consociational democracy may no longer be necessary, and competitive practices may 
emerge. When measuring de-consociational transition, we must look at the practices within the 
system to see if it has truly reached a post-consociational state or is moving in that direction.  
Consociational democracy is marked by the consensus-building actions of elites. The emergence 
of more majoritarian and competitive practices would, thus, mark a transition away from 
consociationalism.  It is important to note the effect that this change in behaviour has on the 
system.  These changes must occur smoothly without increasing the tensions again within 
society.  As was noted in Belgium and Lebanon earlier, there were instances where competitive 
and majoritarian practices emerged, but it led to a destabilization of society and cannot be 
considered a de-consociational transition.  Thus, the stable emergence of adversarial, competitive 
practices within these systems is an indicator that states are undergoing or have undergone a de-
consociational transition. 
7.1.0 - Were competitive political practices able to emerge smoothly in society? 
 7.1.1 – The Netherlands 
 From 1967 to the modern era, the Netherlands has undergone a clear transition from a 
consociational system to a competitive political system.  It has done so by changing the 
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conventions guiding elite behaviour and the electorate without changing any of the institutional 
features.  As has been mentioned at length, a consociational democracy requires the elites to 
cooperate and rule prudently.  This means that on top of the institutional features of the system, 
the conventions guiding the elites and their interactions are of utmost importance.  Thus, when 
the elites stop following those conventions and it does not raise the tensions within society, a de-
consociational transition is occurring.  This can be seen in the Netherlands. 
 The first convention is that of the grand coalition.  As was discussed, the Netherlands 
never truly embodied this as at least one pillar party was always in opposition.  Nonetheless, the 
Netherlands was unique with almost always using majority surplus coalitions with often up to 
75% of the seats in parliament reflected in government.  In the post-consociational era from 1967 
onward, coalitions are still required to rule.  The size of the coalitions has changed significantly, 
however.  Now, most coalitions are minimum-winning, meaning that the coalitions are big 
enough to just receive a parliamentary majority. From 1967-2007, there were 10 minimum 
winning coalitions and 3 surplus majority183.  The coalitions got significantly less inclusive, 
which is a massive deviation from consociational norms. It is also important to note that these 
coalitions were much more prone to split due to internal dissent, thus highlighting the increased 
adversarial and political nature of the Dutch elite184.   
This increased politicization is another de-consociational indicator, because one of the 
most important principles in a consociational democracy is to treat politics as a serious business 
and not a game. This politicization manifests in a number of ways.  For one, government 
formation now takes longer.  In the consociational era, it was a foregone conclusion that the 
                                                          
183 Rudy B. Andeweg, “Coalition Politics in the Netherlands: From Accommodation to Politicization,” 257-258 




pillar parties would form government and there was some deliberation as one was usually 
relegated to opposition-status.  Due to the increased politicization, government formation takes 
considerably longer.  Now, the door to government has been opened to non-pillar parties – 
another de-consociational indicator as this never happened during the consociational era - and 
thus government formation takes the form of political bargaining185.  This politicization is also 
reflected in cabinet through the appointment of cabinet ministers.  These appointments were 
largely technocratic in the consociational period, but from 1967 onward, they took on a 
considerably more political tone as party leaders now almost always take a cabinet position186.  
This increased politicization has also manifested in regular parliamentary procedure.  It was 
noted earlier that during the consociational period, legislation was not seriously contested.  This 
changed significantly as the number of amendments to bills went from 150 per year during the 
consociational era, to more than 1000 per year after 1967 for about the same number of bills187.  
Finally, the re-emergence of parliamentary inquiries used to investigate serious matters, which 
went unused during the consociational period, also shows increased politicization as the 
legislature is no longer as deferent to cabinet188. 
This clearly shows that it is no longer a strongly held convention that the elites need to 
avoid playing political games and opposing one another in parliament.  The fact that this 
opposition has not increased tensions in Dutch society shows that they have undergone a de-
consociational transition. 
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Another key characteristic of a consociational democracy is the deference of the citizens 
to the elites.  The people do not challenge the elites and allow them to make deals with the rival 
segments. This is shown through the stability of the electoral and party system.  This has been 
one of the most noticeable areas where the Dutch political system has changed as it has become 
much more volatile.  The Catholic party was a pivot party during the Dutch consociational 
period, but from 1994-2002, for the first time since WW1, they were relegated to the 
opposition189.  More recently, the Labour Party faced the most significant drop in support in its 
history when their electoral results dropped from 24.8% to 5.7% in 2017190.   
This extreme volatility came at the same time as the incredible proliferation of new 
political parties.  During the consociational era, the party system was very stable with the five 
pillar parties being dominant and there being some small parties receiving a few seats.  Now, 
there are countless parties all receiving a significant amount of support.  The emergence of 
Democrats ’66 (D66) in 1966 marked a shift in the Dutch political system and many new parties 
have emerged since then191.  To emphasize this point, one needs only look at the results from the 
2017 election. The traditional pillar parties together only received 39.4% of the vote.  The rest of 
the support went to ‘new’ parties that do not represent the traditional segments192.  For 
comparison, during the consociational era, the pillar parties got 75-90% of the vote193.  This 
shows the incredible changes that have occurred within the Dutch electoral system and the 
‘newfound’ lack of deference the electorate has to the traditional elites.  It is no longer assumed 
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that they will represent the people in the decision-making process.  They have to fight for 
support. 
Ultimately, what this discussion has shown is how significantly the Dutch political 
system has changed.  Where once it was a democracy that focused on consensus-building with an 
incredibly deferential electorate it has turned into a democracy that has fully embraced 
adversarial and politicized tactics.  The electorate is no longer deferential and the pillar parties 
now need to fight a large amount of new parties for the support they could take for granted 
during the consociational era.  The Netherlands is no longer a consociational democracy. 
7.1.2 – Belgium 
As the previous chapters have highlighted, Belgium remains heavily divided along the 
ethno-linguistic cleavage, and these divisions continue to cause tensions that must be alleviated.  
What is interesting about Belgium is that their current consociational system operates in an 
intermittent fashion.  While the cooperation of the elites on a day to day basis to pass legislation 
remains important, its consociational colours truly come to the forefront when the ethno-
linguistic tensions explode.  Earlier, the case of BHV was mentioned to show the extent to which 
these divisions can strain Belgian society, and it is in those instances that true consociationalism 
becomes apparent.  These tensions have erupted numerous times – in 1970, 1980, 1988, 1993, 
2001/2003, and 2011/2012194.  The 1970 reforms set the stage for how consociationalism would 
be practiced in the new era whenever a crisis erupts. There is a summit meeting of all key 
political actors discussing the issue (grand coalition), and the eventual devolution of powers to 
the regions in order to alleviate tensions (segmental autonomy)195.  It is also noteworthy that after 
                                                          
194 Rudy B. Andeweg, “Consociationalism in the Low Countries: Comparing the Dutch and Belgian Experience,” 
417-418 




the 1970 reforms, each group has a veto power, thus contributing to the consociational nature of 
the bargaining process. Thus, whenever tensions emerge, these consociational practices are used 
to eventually alleviate the tensions.  
Day to day, Belgium still has many of the important consociational characteristics.  There 
is the mandatory linguistic parity in cabinet, and the governing coalitions still require many 
actors to be represented.  The minority veto is firmly entrenched in the legislative process, and it 
is frequently mentioned when discussions are ongoing – as shown by the BHV process.  Their 
most important consociational feature is the segmental autonomy, represented in its highly 
decentralized federal structure, where the ethno-linguistic groups live almost completely separate 
lives. Clearly, Belgium still resembles the consociational model day-to-day 
It is important to note that, as discussed earlier, Belgian elite do have a tendency to act in 
a majoritarian manner, forcing them to revert to consociational practices in order to deal with the 
crisis that emerges.  This proves that it remains a consociational democracy to this day, because 
competitive and adversarial political practices cannot emerge smoothly.  These adversarial 
policies, like those during the BHV ordeal, resulted in significant destabilization and required 
extensive negotiation and compromise to deal with.  While Belgium’s model may differ from 
other states, with its intermittent use of consociatioanalism196, it has not undergone a transition 
like the Netherlands. 
7.1.3 – Lebanon 
In Lebanon, consociational democracy remains a crucial part of the day-to-day operation 
of the system.  All governments require the representation of all major segments and the two 
political alliances. These negotiations remain tense and difficult due to the various actors that 
                                                          




need to be dealt with in order to maintain a sense of stability in society.  This is shown by the 8 
months it took former-Prime Minister Saad Hariri to form a government after elections in 
2019197.  When Hariri resigned months later due to the popular protests, it caused a mini-crisis as 
the government had to find a new prime minister that is accepted by all parties198.  They also still 
utilise the minority veto – through the effective vetoes of the three highest offices – and 
segmental autonomy – as the elites are the primary means with which resources are diverted 
from the government to society and the identity groups still have significant authority over day-
to-day laws – showing that they remain a consociational democracy. 
Finally, there are cases where adversarial practices emerged in Lebanon, but immediately 
destabilized society and the political system, thus - like Belgium - they resorted to more 
consociational means in order to solve the crisis. The best example of this is the series of events 
leading to the Doha Accord.  From 2005-2008 it was tense in Lebanon as Rafic Hariri had been 
assassinated and Syria left the country. The political system was now beginning to operate under 
the two new political alliances and there were tensions between them.  In 2007, March 14 
rejected a deal from March 8 regarding the presidency and cabinet portfolios which further 
increased tensions.  To make matters worse, the government took actions that were perceived to 
be against Hezbollah, a powerful member of the March 8 Alliance.  At its height, the country 
was on the brink of another civil war but was saved by the Doha Accord.  This agreement 
adjusted the power-sharing arrangement, as now the opposition was guaranteed a third of the 
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cabinet seats, granting it a veto power – as decisions are made with a 2/3 majority199.  This shows 
that when adversarial policies emerge, it significantly destabilizes the political system, resulting 
in consociational methods being used to alleviate the tensions.  In the case of the Doha Accord, 
these measures re-emphasized the consociational system and provided greater opportunities for 
the opposition to take part in the decision-making process, further entrenching the consociational 
system.  It is clear then, that Lebanon has also not undergone a de-consociational transition. 
7.1.4 – Comparison 
What has become clear is that out of the three cases, the Netherlands is the only state to 
have undergone a de-consociational transition.  The Dutch elite have begun to use competitive 
tactics, while in Belgium and Lebanon these adversarial practices emerge from time to time but 
significantly destabilize society and require consociationalism to rebuild stability. What is 
interesting is the difference in the way that consociational democracy manifests in those two 
states.  In Belgium it operates in a much more intermittent fashion in order to alleviate tensions 
that arise from time to time, whereas in Lebanon it remains a crucial part of day-to-day 
governance of the elites. This shows the flexibility of the system, as different approaches can be 
taken to stabilize society.  
Ultimately, the diminishing of divisions and tensions within society is necessary for a de-
consociational transition to emerge.  In a society where the divisions and tensions are still stark, 
competitive practices cannot emerge smoothly as they destabilize society – as shown by Belgium 
and Lebanon.  On the other hand, if the divisions and tensions have been dealt with, the 
competitive practices can gradually emerge without destabilizing society – as shown by the 
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Netherlands.  Thus, dealing with the underlying reasons behind a consociational democracy is 
necessary for it to transition to a competitive democracy. 
CHAPTER 8 – CONCLUSION 
 
What this study has shown is that de-consociational transition is impacted by many 
factors.  In order for a state to transition, it needs to deal with the underlying factors that caused a 
consociational democracy to be necessary in the first place.  Without this, it will remain 
necessary to mediate divisions and this will stop attempts at a transition.  These underlying 
tensions and divisions can be aggravated by a number of factors, so these are important to pay 
attention to when considering this transition.  Out of the three cases, the Netherlands is the only 
state to undergo a transition from consociationalism to a competitive democracy.  Adversarial 
practices were able to emerge without destabilizing society.  Lebanon and Belgium both had 
periods where these types of adversarial policy practices emerged, but they quickly destabilized 
the system and they had to resort to consociational practices to bring stability back to society.  
These countries remain consociational democracies. 
Thus, if one wants to answer the question of why some countries are successful at 
transitioning, it makes sense to compare the successful case of the Netherlands with the 
unsuccessful cases of Lebanon and Belgium.  What has become obvious over the course of this 
study is that the Netherlands appears to be the “perfect” case for consociationalism.  All of the 
important factors worked in their favour.  For one, they fully embodied the model and its four 
characteristics. They did not have antagonistic historical narratives between the groups that 
would cause further tensions and strengthen divisions.  The Dutch elite were skilled and able to 
come together and rule prudently day-to-day.  Finally, the Netherlands was also incredibly lucky, 
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as they did not have any severe loads to deal with that could have strained the consociational 
system.  
 The other two cases were not quite as lucky.  Both systems embodied the consociational 
model well, as their systems included the four characteristics that Lijphart outlined. After this, 
there are difficulties.  Both Belgium and Lebanon had noteworthy antagonisms between their 
different segments, and this flared up from time to time straining relations between the elites and 
contributing to a destabilization of society.  These tensions were further exacerbated in the daily 
leadership of the elites.  Both Belgium and Lebanon had clear examples of elites that ruled 
prudently and put cooperation and consensus-building above political games, but these systems 
also had examples of majoritarian and self-serving practices used by the elite.  This contributed 
to tension and periods of destabilization in the systems.  Finally these states were unlucky as they 
had to face significant loads that strained their consociational systems.  In Belgium’s case, these 
loads were domestic political controversies that were exacerbated by majoritarian political 
practices, resulting in crisis before being dealt with in a consociational manner.  In Lebanon, 
these loads were much more deadly as they are a result of Lebanon’s placement in a tense 
regional system.  Lebanon is very susceptible to the political battles played by their neighbours 
and this has destabilized their system to the point where the elites could not save it.   
 Ultimately, all of the above factors led to a successful diminishing of the religious and 
socio-economic divisions and tensions in Dutch society, allowing competitive political practices 
to emerge and the Netherlands to undergo a de-consociational transition. They were able to 
create a stable political culture and a peaceful society which allowed for the divisions between 
people to slowly erode.  It is also important to note that there was considerable economic 
development in the Netherlands, likely helping the erosion of these divisions.  This is not quite 
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the case in Belgium and Lebanon.  The initial divisions in Belgium were very similar to that of 
the Netherlands, and these eroded around the same time as those in the Netherlands.   
Unfortunately for Belgium, there was a latent ethno-linguistic division that remained 
present and this came to the forefront when the other divisions went away.  There was also 
considerable economic development in Belgium, but in a much more uneven fashion with 
Flanders becoming the economic heart of the country and Wallonia struggling.  This further 
increased the divisions, and now the Belgian system is completely dominated by the ethno-
linguistic divide.  Finally, Lebanon is still dominated by the divisions that led to the 
consociational system initially.  They have been entrenched in the institutional structure of the 
state and the country’s troubled history has further inflamed these tensions as groups have 
considerable grievances with one another due to the legacy of the civil war. It is also important to 
note that Lebanon never economically recovered after the civil war, and faces incredible 
economic hardship to this day. 
 Thus, what can be shown by this paper is that in order for a state to be able to transition 
from a consociational democracy, the divisions within society must be diminished.  This stands 
to reason, as these systems are meant to deal with unsustainable divisions in society.  Once the 
system has successfully dealt with this, it will gradually allow for adversarial practices to emerge 
smoothly and the transition can begin.  There are various factors that can hurt this process by 
destabilizing society – strong antagonistic narratives, the lack of prudent leadership, and the 
presence of loads on the system.  Some of these factors are beyond anyone’s ability to prevent – 
such as antagonisms between segments and the emergence of certain loads – but it is up to the 
elites to deal with them effectively.  Ultimately, if everything goes smoothly, a state can 
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